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Analogical Problem Solving 
MARY L. GICK AND KEITH J. HOLYOAK 
University of Michigan 
The use of an analogy from a semantically distant domain to guide the problem- 
solving process was investigated. The representation of analogy in memory and 
processes involved in the use of analogies were discussed theoretically and 
explored in five experiments. In Experiment I oral protocols were used to exam- 
ine the processes involved in solving a problem by analogy. In all experiments 
subjects who first read a story about a military problem and its solution tended to 
generate analogous solutions to a medical problem (Duncker’s “radiation prob- 
lem”), provided they were given a hint to use the story to help solve the problem. 
Transfer frequency was reduced when the problem presented in the military story 
was substantially disanalogous to the radiation problem, even though the solution 
illustrated in the story corresponded to an effective radiation solution (Experiment 
II). Subjects in Experiment III tended to generate analogous solutions to the 
radiation problem after providing their own solutions to the military problem. 
Subjects were able to retrieve the story from memory and use it to generate an 
analogous solution, even when the critical story had been memorized in the con- 
text of two distractor stories (Experiment IV). However, when no hint to consider 
the story was given, frequency of analogous solutions decreased markedly. This 
decrease in transfer occurred when the story analogy was presented in a recall 
task along with distractor stories (Experiment IV), when it was presented alone, 
and when it was presented in between two attempts to solve the problem (Experi- 
ment V). Component processes and strategic variations in analogical problem 
solving were discussed. Issues related to noticing analogies and accessing them in 
memory were also examined, as was the relationship of analogical reasoning to 
other cognitive tasks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Where do new ideas come from? What psychological mechanisms 
underlie creative insight? This fundamental issue in the study of thought 
has received a great deal of informal discussion, but little empirical 
psychological investigation. The anecdotal reports of creative scientists 
and mathematicians suggest that the development of a new theory fre- 
quently depends on noticing and applying an analogy drawn from a differ- 
ent domain of knowledge (Hadamard, 1954). The hydraulic model of the 
blood circulation system, the planetary model of atomic structure, and the 
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“billiard ball” model of gases all represent major scientific theories 
founded on analogies (Boden, 1977, Chap. 11). 
As these examples suggest, fruitful analogies may be based on a map- 
ping of relations between two very disparate domains. In the brainstorm- 
ing technique of “Synectics,” problem-solving groups are trained to ac- 
tively search for analogies in areas other than that of the target problem 
(Gordon, 1961). It seems clear, however, that the “semantic distance” 
between analogous domains can vary a great deal. For example, Polya 
(1957) suggests that a useful strategy for solving geometry problems is to 
search for analogous problems within the domain of geometry. Analogies 
drawn within a domain may also play a role in categorization tasks. Clas- 
sification models based on comparisons of instances, which have been 
developed both in psychology (Brooks, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 1978) 
and in artificial intelligence (Winston, 1975), involve comparisons be- 
tween objects within a single domain (e.g., geometric patterns). Collins 
and his associates (Collins, Warnock, Aiello, & Miller, 1975) have used 
protocol analyses to investigate the role of analogical reasoning by stu- 
dents who have incomplete knowledge of a problem domain such as geog- 
raphy. For example, a student might evaluate whether the region around 
Santiago, Chile is likely to produce wine by comparing it to a known 
wine-producing area, such as Northern California, on the relevant geo- 
graphic dimensions (e.g., latitude, proximity to ocean, type of terrain). 
While the process of solving analogy test items of the form A:B::C:D 
has been studied quite extensively (Sternberg, 1977a, 1977b), there has 
been little experimental investigation of analogical thinking in more com- 
plex problem-solving tasks. Some studies have examined transfer be- 
tween homomorphic or isomorphic versions of puzzle problems, such as 
the “missionaries and cannibals” (Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974) and 
Tower of Hanoi (Hayes & Simon, 1977) puzzles. These are relatively 
“well-defined” problems (Reitman, 1964; Simon, 1973), in which the ini- 
tial conditions, legal operations, and goal state are explicitly specified. In 
contrast, anecdotal reports of the use of analogies typically involve prob- 
lems that are much less well defined. The present study was designed to 
investigate the use of analogies between disparate domains as a guide to 
finding solutions for an ill-defined problem. 
THE RADIATION PROBLEM AND ITS ANALOGIES 
Our basic experimental procedure was to provide subjects with a story 
analogy, describing a problem and its solution, and then to observe how 
subjects used the analogy in solving a subsequent target problem. The 
target problem was Duncker’s (1945) “radiation problem,” which in our 
experiments was stated as follows. 
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant 
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tumor in his stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient, but unless 
the tumor is destroyed the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can 
be used to destroy the tumor. If the rays reach the tumor all at once at a 
sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be destroyed. Unfortunately, at 
this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass through on the way to 
the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower intensities the rays are harm- 
less to healthy tissue, but they will not affect the tumor either. What type 
of procedure might be used to destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the 
same time avoid destroying the healthy tissue? 
There are several reasons why the radiation problem seemed especially 
suitable for use in a study of analogical problem solving. First, it has all 
the hallmarks of the kind of “ill-defined” problem for which an analogy 
from a remote domain might trigger a creative insight. The desired goal 
state is specified only at a relatively abstract level, and the permissible 
operations that might be used to achieve the goal are left very open ended. 
As a consequence, the possible solution proposals vary considerably. 
This made it possible to test for the use of analogies by attempting to 
influence the specific solutions that subjects would generate. 
In addition, we were able to benefit from Duncker’s analyses of the 
performance of subjects who worked on the problem without receiving an 
analogy. Duncker identified three broad categories of proposed solutions 
to the radiation problem: (1) reducing the intensity of the rays as they pass 
through the healthy tissue; (2) avoiding contact between the rays and 
healthy tissue; and (3) altering the relative sensitivity to rays of the 
healthy tissue and the tumor (e.g., by immunizing the healthy tissue or 
sensitizing the tumor). Our analogies were designed to guide subjects 
toward specific versions of the first two classes of proposals. 
Our general aim in the present study, then, was to explore the process 
by which subjects use analogies between remote domains to generate 
problem solutions. Consequently, we wrote a series of stories far re- 
moved from the medical domain, each involving a military problem and its 
solution, which were analogous to the radiation problem. We will intro- 
duce the various stories as we proceed; all are presented in the Appen- 
dixes. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
It is important to develop a general conceptual framework within which 
specific issues concerning the role of analogies in problem solving can be 
formulated. What is meant by analogy, and how can an analogy be used to 
generate a problem solution? 
In order to make our discussion more concrete we will consider the 
major story analogy used in the present experiments and the correspond- 
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ing solution to the radiation problem. In the Attack-Dispersion story’ a 
general wishes to capture a fortress located in the center of a country. 
There are many roads radiating outward from the fortress. All have been 
mined so that while small groups of men can pass over the roads safely, 
any large force will detonate the mines. A full-scale direct attack is there- 
fore impossible. The general’s solution is to divide his army into small 
groups, send each group to the head of a different road, and have the 
groups converge simultaneously on the fortress. The analogous solution 
to the radiation problem is to simultaneously direct multiple low-intensity 
rays toward the tumor from different directions. In this way the healthy 
tissue will be left unharmed, but the effects of the multiple low-intensity 
rays will summate and destroy the tumor. 
At an intuitive level the parallels between the Attack-Dispersion story 
and the radiation problem are clear. Both situations involve an object that 
must be overcome, surrounded by objects that must be preserved. The 
target object in each case occupies a topographically central position in its 
environment. In each situation the protagonist has available a weapon 
with an effect proportional to the intensity or amount of the weapon that is 
used, and so on. 
How might people represent these analogical relationships and use 
them to generate a solution to the target problem? This is not an easy 
question to answer. First of all, both the story and the problem must be 
read and understood. In attempting to describe this type of analogical 
problem solving we thus inherit all the problems associated with text 
comprehension. In particular, perception of analogy hinges on semantic 
knowledge and inference procedures. Since no general theory of language 
understanding is available, we must of necessity gloss over many impor- 
tant issues related to the understanding process. However, recent work 
on story comprehension (Black & Bower, in press; Kintsch, 1974; 
Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978; Rumelhart, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977; 
Thorndyke, 1977) may offer some insights into how our story analogies 
might be represented in memory. Indeed, there appear to be close ties 
between the concept of analogy and the concept of “schema,” which has 
been widely applied in discussions of prose comprehension. In essence, 
both an analogy and a schema consist of an organized system of relations. 
Consequently, the framework for analogical problem solving presented 
here will draw its conceptual vocabulary from various schema-based 
models, as well as from Sternberg’s (1977a, 1977b) model of component 
processes involved in analogical reasoning. We will first consider how 
’ In fact, three versions of this story were used in different experiments (see Appendixes 
I-III). The versions differed only in minor points of wording of no consequence to the 
present discussion. 
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analogy might be represented, and then how this representation could be 
used to generate a solution to a problem. 
The Representation of Analogy 
A system of representation for analogy must be able to describe a 
fundamental property of such relational systems, namely, that analogy 
may be defined at multiple levels of abstraction. For example, at a rela- 
tively low level of abstraction the Attack-Dispersion story and the radia- 
tion problem have a variety of corresponding details (e.g., small groups of 
soldiers correspond to low-intensity rays). At a more abstract level, the 
story and the problem both involve the goal of overpowering an object 
located in a region that must be preserved. 
The multileveled nature of analogy can perhaps be understood in the 
context of Kintsch and Van Dijk’s (1978) theory of prose representation. 
They argue that the understanding process may involve the iterative ap- 
plication of a set of inference rules that generate increasingly abstract 
“macrostructure” representations of a prose passage. These macro- 
structures essentially correspond to summaries of the passage at various 
levels of generality. In the case of a problem-oriented story such as the 
Attack-Dispersion story, an abstract level of macrostructure might state a 
general solution principle (e.g., to destroy a target when direct application 
of a large force is harmful to the surrounding area, disperse the attacking 
forces, and have them converge at the target). The process of extracting a 
solution principle might thus be viewed as a special case of the process of 
deriving macrostructures for a body of information. While much remains 
to be learned about how this process operates, the three specific inference 
rules proposed by Kintsch and Van Dijk (which they term “deletion,” 
“generalization,” and “construction”) would seem readily applicable to 
the type of story analogies we are considering here. 
Kintsch and Van Dijk emphasize that control processes are required to 
select a level of macrostructure analysis consistent with the person’s 
processing goals. Similarly, we assume there is an optimal level of 
abstraction at which analogical relations may be represented in order to 
effectively guide the solution process. Indeed, an important empirical 
issue is to determine what factors influence this optimal level of abstrac- 
tion. 
We will now consider in more detail how an analogy between two 
relational systems might be represented, assuming an appropriate level of 
macrostructure has been derived. To pursue our example, Table 1 pre- 
sents our own summary of the Attack-Dispersion story, as well as a sum- 
mary of the radiation problem and its dispersion solution. These sum- 
maries are intended to reflect the major causal connections within both 
the story and the problem, and to illustrate the major analogical relations 
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between them. The sentences in Table 1 are numbered to correspond to 
an approximate propositional analysis presented in Fig. 1. Propositions 
from the story and from the radiation problem are matched to indicate 
analogical relations, and the propositions corresponding to the dispersion 
solution to the radiation problem (which a person would be required to 
generate) are italicized in both the table and the figure. Note that some of 
the propositions included in the story summary (e.g., proposition 11) are 
inferences, which are not directly stated in the original story (see Appen- 
dix I). 
The notation in Fig. 1 consists of propositional functions, in which 
predicates are followed by one or more arguments (enclosed in paren- 
theses). The arguments fill various semantic roles, such as agent, ob- 
TABLE 1 
A Summary of Attack-Dispersion Story and of Corresponding 




l-2 A fortress was located in the center of the country. 
2a Many roads radiated out from the fortress. 
3-4 A general wanted to capture the fortress with his army. 
5-7 The general wanted to prevent mines on the roads from destroying his 
army and neighboring villages. 
8 As a result the entire army could not attack the fortress along one road. 
9- 10 However, the entire army was needed to capture the fortress. 
11 So an attack by one small group would not succeed. 
12 The general therefore divided his army into several small groups. 
13 He positioned the small groups at the heads of different roads. 
14- 15 The small groups simultaneously converged on the fortress. 





Radiation problem and dispersion solution” 
A tumor was located in the interior of a patient’s body. 
A doctor wanted to destroy the tumor with rays. 
The doctor wanted to prevent the rays from destroying healthy tissue. 








However, high-intensity rays were needed to destroy the tumor. 
So applying one low-intensity ray would not succeed. 
The doctor therefore divided the rays into several low-intensity rays. 
He positioned the low-intensity rays at multiple locations around the 
patient’s body. 
The low-intensity rays simultaneously converged on the tumor. 
In this way the rays destroyed the tumor. 
n Italicized propositions summarize the target dispersion solution. 
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ject, and location. Propositions may themselves serve as arguments, so in 
several cases one proposition is embedded in another. We make no claims 
about the logical adequacy or completeness of the representation in Fig. 
1; indeed, many of the indicated arguments (e.g., “low-intensity rays”) 
clearly could be further decomposed. However, separation of relations 
(predicates) and arguments serves to highlight the critical properties of 
analogy between remote domains: similarity of corresponding relations 
despite dissimilarity of corresponding arguments. 
The notation in Fig. 1 has been augmented by labeled arcs that repre- 
sent the major causal connections within the Attack-Dispersion story and 
the radiation problem. The labels are inspired by but not identical to the 
analysis of causal types offered by &hank and Abelson (1977) (see also 
Black & Bower, in press). Roughly, a goal can be a “reason” for an 
action; a state or action can “enable” a subsequent action; an action can 
“result” in a subsequent state; and a state or action can “prevent” a 
subsequent action. Again, the adequacy of this analysis is not really crit- 
ical for our present purpose, which is simply to make salient the corre- 
spondences in causal structure between the story and the problem, par- 
ticularly with respect to the target solution. Note that the labeled arcs are 
equivalent to higher-order predicates that embed numbered propositions 
as arguments. 
The representation in Fig. 1 can be used to highlight a variety of prop- 
erties of analogy, as well as some of the issues we have glossed over in 
constructing this representation. Fundamentally, an analogy consists of a 
yre @nerd. ytue brmm fortress)) 
desm &ml. preat &shuy (mines, army/v~llcqsd) 
6 5 
allack (enhre ormy, fortmrr. ona read) tl  
requre kapture hirers), sntwe army) 
attack bnc small qwp, fwtm.ss) 
tgeenad, ormy, small grwpr) 
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y2 I 
radiate (roods, fortress) 
$s.e kkctw, B”” mys, tumw11 
(dacta, p$vent $strny(roys, healthy t!ssuaN 
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W groups, different roads) 
konvenp bmatl groqs. fatressl) 
FIG. 1. Analogical correspondences between the Attack-Dispersion story and the radia- 
tion problem. 
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mapping between two sets of propositions. Propositions are matched on 
the basis of similarity between the corresponding relations. Note that 
similarity need not imply identity. There need only be a consistent trans- 
formation that maps one set of relations onto the other. Boden (1977) 
gives the example of the Black Mass, which is based on systematic 
semantic reversals of the Catholic ritual. In the case of our story and 
problem, we wrote the summaries to maximize the similarity of the rela- 
tions. Yet dividing an army (proposition 12), for example, is clearly not 
quite the same as dividing high-intensity rays (proposition 12’). To gener- 
ate this aspect of the parallel solution the person would need to take 
account of the relevant differences between an army and rays, perhaps 
explicitly introducing multiple machines that each emit low-intensity rays. 
In order to map proposition 1 onto 1’ a person must have semantic knowl- 
edge of the relation between the meanings of “center” and “interior.” 
Incidentally, note that we assume proposition 1’ is included in the mac- 
restructure for the problem as an inference based on knowledge of where 
the stomach is located. In the case of propositions 16 and 16’, we assume 
the person will use semantic knowledge to transform the relation of 
“capturing” into the relation of “destroying,” operating on the common 
semantic core (i.e., “overcoming”) that links the two relations. 
As Fig. 1 indicates, there is clearly a high degree of correspondence 
between the propositions of the story and of the problem. At the same 
time, the systems are not perfectly isomorphic. It is probably the case that 
analogies used to guide problem solving are generally incomplete in some 
respects (Gentner, Note 1). For example, proposition 2a in the Attack- 
Dispersion story, which states that many roads radiate outward from the 
fortress, has no parallel in the statement of the radiation problem. Note 
that in the story this proposition serves as an important enabling condition 
for the solution. The absence of any explicit mention in the radiation 
problem of multiple paths to the target object would presumably hinder 
generation of the dispersion solution. 
For the above example it is plausible to argue that people must infer the 
fact that there are multiple potential “routes” to the tumor in the course 
of generating the dispersion solution, even though no such inference is 
represented in Fig. 1. But in addition, Fig. 1 reveals at least one clear 
disanalogy between the story and the problem. In a complete analogy, 
there is a consistent mapping between pairs of arguments. That is, wher- 
ever argument A occurs in one relational system, argument A’ occurs in 
the other. For example, in Fig. 1 the role the fortress plays in the story 
consistently maps onto the role the tumor plays in the problem. Note that 
the role of the army usually corresponds to that of the rays. However, this 
is not the case in propositions 5 and 5’. In the Attack-Dispersion story, 
sending the entire army down one road will result in destruction of the 
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army (as well as neighboring villages) by mines; whereas in the radiation 
problem applying high-intensity rays to the tumor will result in destruc- 
tion of the healthy tissue by the rays. In other words, the army and the 
rays do not till corresponding semantic roles in propositions 5 and 5’; 
rather, the army is the object of the process of destruction in 5, while the 
rays are the instrument of the destruction in 5’. 
This example illustrates that degree of analogy in part depends on the 
level of abstraction at which the analogy is defined. In macrostructures 
slightly more abstract than those depicted in Fig. 1, the fact that an attack 
by the entire army is impossible would map onto the fact that direct 
application of high-intensity rays is impossible. At this level the roles of 
the army and of the rays correspond appropriately. However, the story 
and the problem are disanalogous at the more specific level depicted in 
Fig. 1 (i.e., the level of the reas0n.s why the two respective courses of 
action are blocked). This observation suggests that for use in solving a 
problem the optimal level of abstraction for representing an analogy may 
be that which maximizes the degree of correspondence between the two 
relational systems. In many cases a very detailed representation will in- 
clude disanalogous relations, while a very abstract representation will 
omit information about important correspondences. 
The Process of Analogical Problem Solving 
So far we have been discussing how analogical relations may be repre- 
sented; we must now consider how this information might be used to 
generate a solution to a problem. For our story analogy and target prob- 
lem the solution process appears to require three major steps. 
(1) A representation of the story analogy and of the target problem (i.e., 
its initial state and goal state) must be constructed, as described above. 
(2) The representation of the story must be mapped onto that of the 
problem. If the story and the problem are drawn from remote domains, as 
in our example, the correspondences between arguments will not be im- 
mediately obvious. We would therefore expect the mapping process to be 
initiated by detection of similar relations in the two systems. For example, 
the person might notice that propositions 2 and 2’ both involve location. 
Accordingly, a mapping between the two propositions will be established. 
This will automatically establish a mapping between the corresponding 
arguments (i.e., the fortress and the tumor, the center of the country and 
the interior of the body). Once a few such correspondences have been 
detected, the mapping process may proceed in a more “top-down” man- 
ner, guided by expectations that previously mapped arguments will con- 
tinue to play parallel roles. For example, having mapped propositions 2 
and 2’, the person might assume that 8 maps onto 8’ because the role of 
the fortress should correspond to that of the tumor. 
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(3) Finally, the person must use the mapping to generate the parallel 
solution to the target problem. This can be done by constructing a set of 
solution propositions for the target problem that correspond to the solu- 
tion propositions of the story. For example, consider how proposition 12’ 
might be generated on the basis of proposition 12. The mapping process 
will have identified the general with the doctor and the army with the rays. 
Accordingly, “doctor” and “rays” will be used to fill the argument slots 
corresponding to “general” and “army.” In addition, the relation be- 
tween the general and the army in 12 will be used to construct a parallel 
relation between the doctor and the rays in 12’. Thus the idea of the 
general dividing the army into several small groups will be transformed 
into the idea of the doctor dividing the rays into a number of low-intensity 
rays, initiating the dispersion solution to the radiation problem. 
ISSUES AND EXPERIMENTS 
A number of important questions arise within the framework of the 
process model we have outlined. A major issue, which we touched upon 
earlier, concerns the level of macrostructure at which the mapping pro- 
cess takes place. At one extreme the solution process might amount to 
abstracting a solution principle from the story and then applying it to the 
target problem. At the other extreme subjects might map the corre- 
spondences between the story and the problem at the most detailed possi- 
ble level. It is possible, of course, that the mapping process may actually 
proceed partially in parallel on several different levels. 
Even at a single level of macrostructure, there may be strategic varia- 
tions in the degree of mapping that takes place during the solution pro- 
cess. For example, subjects need not derive the entire set of corre- 
spondences outlined in Fig. 1 in order to generate the dispersion solution. 
One possibility, which we will term the “solution-focusing” strategy, is 
that subjects attempting to apply the story analogy will immediately iden- 
tify the solution propositions of the story. By doing the minimal amount of 
mapping required to match the arguments in these propositions with ar- 
guments in the radiation problem, the parallel solution could be gener- 
ated. Subjects using the solution-focusing strategy might thus solve the 
target problem without entirely grasping the correspondences between 
the problem statements in the story and in the radiation problem. 
Given the lack of empirical research on analogical problem solving, 
even more basic issues arise. We have sketched a model of how in princi- 
ple a problem might be solved on the basis of an analogy. However, we do 
not know whether subjects could actually execute this kind of process for 
our story analogies and target problem. There seem to be at least three 
distinct ways in which subjects who have a relevant analogy available 
might nonetheless fail to derive the parallel solution to a target problem. 
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The first and most basic is that subjects might be unable to successfully 
apply the story analogy even if they tried. Second, even if a story analogy 
is potentially useful, subjects might be unable to locate it in memory, 
especially if it had been encoded in the context of irrelevant distractor 
stories. Third, subjects might be able to retrieve a potentially useful anal- 
ogy and yet fail to spontaneously notice its relevance to the target 
problem. 
The experiments reported below were designed to explore these and 
related issues. In Experiments I-III subjects were presented with story 
analogies and given a hint to use them to solve the radiation problem. In 
addition to investigating whether subjects can in fact use analogies to 
generate problem solutions, Experiments I and II were intended to pro- 
vide some information about the processes involved in analogical problem 
solving. In Experiment I the oral protocols of subjects solving the target 
problem were analyzed, and in Experiment II the degree of analogical 
correspondence between the story and the target problem was varied. In 
Experiment III subjects were asked to first solve the problem presented in 
the story themselves (rather than having its solution presented to them), 
and then to attempt to use their solutions as aids in solving the target 
problem. Experiments IV and V investigated the ability of subjects to 
solve the target problem on the basis of story analogies stored in memory. 
In addition, the latter two experiments varied whether or not subjects 
were provided with a hint to use a story analogy to help solve the target 
problem. These experiments thus examined the propensity of subjects to 
spontaneously notice and apply potential analogies between remote 
problem domains. 
EXPERIMENT I 
Experiment I was designed to demonstrate that subjects can use an 
analogy from a remote domain as a hint for solving a problem. Subjects 
first read a story analogy, and then attempted to propose as many solu- 
tions as possible to the radiation problem. By varying the nature of the 
solution suggested by the story, we hoped to influence the likelihood that 
subjects would generate specific solutions to the target problem. Subjects’ 
“thinking aloud” protocols were tape recorded and later analyzed as a 
source of evidence regarding the process of analogical problem solving. 
Subjects in three experimental conditions read one of three stories 
about a military problem and its solution (see Appendix I). Table 2 infor- 
mally illustrates the correspondences among the three stories and the 
radiation problem. The statement of the radiation problem (see Introduc- 
tion) was worded so as to minimize obvious lexical or syntactic corre- 
spondences with the story analogies. The Attack-Dispersion, Open Sup- 
ply Route, and Tunnel stories all have identical first paragraphs describing 
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TABLE 2 
Schematic Outline of Duncker’s Radiation Problem Showing 
Correspondences with Analogous Stories 
Problem Statement Radiation problem Story analogies-Experiment I 
Problem setting Doctor has rays. General has army. 
Patient has tumor. Country has dictator. 
Tumor in stomach, surrounded Dictator in fortress in center of 
by healthy tissue. country, surrounded by villages. 
Roads radiate from fortress like 
spokes on a wheel. 
Desired goal Destroy tumor with rays. Capture fortress with army. 
Problem High-intensity rays destroy tumor Entire army can capture fortress, 
constraints but also destroy healthy tissue. but large group detonates mines 
on roads, destroying army and 
villages. 
Low-intensity rays destroy Small group of men can pass safely 
neither tumor nor healthy over roads but can not capture 
tissue. fortress. 
Impossible to operate. 
Solutions 
Type 1 Reduce intensity of rays on way Reduce size of group traveling to 
to tumor. fortress on one road. 
Dispersion (1) Many low intensity rays (1) Many small groups of men 
(Attack- (2) From different directions (2) From different directions 
Dispersion (3) Simultaneously (3) Simultaneously 
story) 
Type 11 Avoid contact between rays and Avoid contact between army and 
healthy tissue. mines. 
(1) Open pas- Send high-intensity rays through General discovers road that is not 
sage an open route, (e.g., esopha- mined, and sends entire army 
(Open Supply pus). down this road. 
Route story) 
(2) Operation Make an incision in stomach wall, Dig tunnel under mines, and send 
(Tunnel story) removing healthy tissue from entire army through. 
path of rays, and apply high 
intensity rays to tumor.” 
Resulting 
goal state 
Radiation of high-intensity 
reaches tumor. 
Tumor destroyed. 
Healthy tissue intact. 
Entire army reaches fortress. 
Fortress captured. 
Army and villages preserved. 
n Incision violates constraint. 
the problem setting, desired goal, and the constraints on a solution. These 
aspects of the stories are analogous to the radiation problem, as discussed 
earlier (see Fig. 1). 
However, the stories differ in their second paragraphs, which state the 
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general’s solution to his problem. In the Attack-Dispersion story (de- 
scribed in the Introduction) the general divides his army into small groups 
and sends them simultaneously down different roads to the fortress. The 
analogous solution to the radiation problem is the “dispersion” solution: 
have multiple low-intensity rays converge at the tumor. This is a very 
effective solution,2 but one which subjects seldom generate spontane- 
ously. Duncker (1945) reported that only 2 of 42 subjects arrived at this 
dispersion solution, and both were prompted by the experimenter. A 
basic difftculty that appears to block generation of this solution is that 
people do not spontaneously think of rays as having the property of “di- 
visibility.” In fact, Duncker found that the frequency of the dispersion 
solution increased when the term “particles” was substituted for “rays” 
(presumably because particles are more obviously divisible). 
In the Open Supply Route story the general discovers an unblocked 
road leading to the fortress, and sends the entire army down this open 
road. An analogous radiation solution is to direct high-intensity rays down 
the esophagus (or some other open passage, such as the intestines) to the 
stomach. This solution was generated relatively frequently by the subjects 
tested by Duncker (29% gave the open passage solution as opposed to 
only 5% who gave the dispersion solution). In the Tunnel story the general 
digs an underground tunnel and sends his army through it to the fortress. 
Analogous radiation solutions might be to operate to expose the tumor to 
the rays, or to insert a tube through the stomach wall and send rays 
through it to the tumor. Many of Duncker’s subjects (40%) spontaneously 
suggested such solutions. However, such procedures to create an open 
route to the tumor involve operating, and hence conflict with one of the 
constraints imposed on the radiation problem (that it is impossible to 
operate). The Tunnel story is therefore a kind of “false analogy” to the 
radiation problem. That is, although the problem statements are analo- 
gous, the solution suggested by the story is inappropriate. If the analogy is 
nevertheless applied, subjects given the Tunnel story might be especially 
likely to momentarily disregard the problem constraints and propose an 
operation solution to the radiation problem. 
Although the above analysis of the analogous relationships between 
various solutions to the military problem and to the radiation problem was 
2 This solution is functionally very similar to the standard medical procedure for radiation 
therapy, which is to rotate the radiation source around the patient (or vice versa) in such a 
way that the tumor is always the focal point of the radiation. The malignancy thus receives a 
cumulative dose of radiation while other areas receive a lesser amount. One difference is 
that our dispersion solution involves simultaneous application of the rays, whereas the 
medical procedure takes advantage of the fact that the effects of radiation summate over 
time. Even knowledge of the medical procedure would therefore be unlikely to lead to the 
exact solution corresponding to the Attack-Dispersion story. 
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initially based on the experimenters’ intuitions, we will see below that 
subjects’ ratings essentially confirm the validity of this analysis. 
The primary prediction in Experiment I was that each story analogy 
would tend to increase the frequency of the analogous solution to the 
radiation problem, relative to the solution frequencies obtained for con- 
trol subjects given no prior story. However, there are additional ways in 
which the story analogies might influence the solutions given to the target 
problem. First, note that the problem statements for all three stories 
contain all the enabling conditions (see Fig. 1) for generating the disper- 
sion solution (e.g., the central location of the fortress, the roads radiating 
outward, the fact that small groups can travel on the roads). Accordingly, 
subjects might spontaneously think of the dispersion solution to the gen- 
eral’s problem, and then use it to generate the parallel solution to the 
radiation problem. If so, subjects given the Open Supply Route and Tun- 
nel stories might also produce the dispersion solution more often than 
would control subjects. 
It is also possible that giving subjects a story analogy may actually 
hinder the generation of nonanalogous solutions. That is, attempting to 
generate a parallel solution to the target problem may create a kind of 
“set” effect, so that other possible solutions (e.g., immunizing the 
healthy tissue to protect it from the rays) will not be discovered. If such a 
set effect is obtained, control subjects should produce more total solu- 
tions than experimental subjects, and in addition there should be qualita- 
tive differences between the solutions produced by control subjects ver- 
sus subjects given story analogies. 
Method 
Subjects were divided into four conditions, each receiving either the Attack-Dispersion 
story, the Open Supply Route story, the Tunnel story, or no story (the control group), prior 
to solving the radiation problem. The control condition used no story at all, rather than an 
irrelevant story, because it seemed possible that an irrelevant story would actually interfere 
with the solution process. (A control condition using an irrelevant story was included in 
Experiment V below.) Subjects were tested individually by a trained experimenter and 
sessions were tape recorded. All subjects first solved Duncker’s (1945) “candle problem” to 
familiarize them with the process of thinking aloud while problem solving. Subjects were 
told that the problems required some creativity for their solutions, and that they should not 
feel inhibited about making any suggestions that came to mind. They were also encouraged 
to give an ongoing account of what they were thinking about. Subjects were asked to begin 
by reading the problem out loud in order to get them used to speaking in front of the 
experimenter. 
Following the practice problem subjects in the experimental conditions were told that they 
would receive two further problems, the first of which would also have a solution given for 
it. They were told to read the first “story problem” aloud and then to orally summarize the 
gist or point of the story. This part of the procedure was omitted for subjects in the control 
condition. All subjects then read the radiation problem and began to solve it. They were 
reminded to talk out loud, and encouraged to interrupt their reading of the problem at any 
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time if a solution occurred to them. Experimental subjects were told to try to use the first 
story problem as a hint in solving the second (radiation) problem. However, they were also 
told that it was not necessary to use the prior story in order to solve the problem. Subjects 
were allowed to reread the story analogy at any time. 
As subjects worked on the radiation problem the experimenter was prepared to intervene 
with an explicit hierarchy of prompts. If  subjects were not explicit about the nature of a 
proposed solution, the experimenter asked them to clarify it, sometimes by drawing a 
diagram. Subjects in the experimental conditions who at first failed to generate the analo- 
gous solution were eventually prompted to reread the instructions. If  they still did not 
produce the analogous solution, they were then reminded to use the prior story as a hint. 
At the end of the session, subjects were asked to rate each of their proposed solutions on 
two 7-point scales, as to how “creative” and how “practical” the solutions are. A rating of 1 
indicated maximum creativity or practicality. 
Forty undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of Michigan 
served as subjects as part of a course requirement. Ten subjects were assigned to each of the 
four conditions. 
Results and Discussion 
Frequencies of analogous solutions. Subjects’ protocols for the radia- 
tion problem were transcribed and scored for the presence of various 
types of proposed solutions, by two independent scorers. For this pur- 
pose any suggestion, even if it was eventually rejected by the subject, was 
counted as a proposed solution. The results of major interest concern the 
three types of proposals that are analogous to the solutions embodied in 
the story analogies-the dispersion solution, the open passage solution, 
and operation solutions. Table 3 presents the percentage of subjects in 
each condition who produced these various types of proposed solutions. 
The frequency of each solution was highest for subjects who received the 
relevant story analogy, i.e., the dispersion solution was most frequent for 
the Attack-Dispersion condition, the open passage solution was most fre- 
quent for the Open Supply Route condition, and operation solutions were 
most frequent for the Tunnel condition. 
These differences in solution frequencies were most dramatic for the 
dispersion solution. All 10 subjects who were given the Attack-Dispersion 
story produced this solution, whereas not a single control subject did so. 
For this solution the frequency differences among the four conditions 
were highly significant, G2(3) = 33.9, p < .OOl, as was a comparison 
between the Attack-Dispersion condition versus all others, G2( 1) = 30.9, 
p < .001.3 
The frequencies of the open passage solution and of operation solutions 
were also influenced by the story analogies. Seventy percent of subjects 
in the Open Supply Route condition produced the open passage solution, 
as opposed to 20% of subjects in all other conditions, G2(1) = 8.21, p < 
3 All contingency table analyses reported in the present paper use the GZ statistic 
(maximum likelihood x2) (Bishop, Fienberg, & Holland, 1975). 
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TABLE 3 
Percentage of Subjects in Each Condition of Experiment I Who 
Proposed Various Solutions to the Radiation Problem 
Proposed solution 
Condition Dispersion Open Passage Operation” 
Attack-Dispersion story 100 10 30 
Open Supply Route story 10 70b 50 
Tunnel story 20 30 80 
Control 0 20 50 
U This solution type includes proposals to operate to clear a path for the rays or to insert 
a tube through the stomach wall and send rays through to the tumor. 
b This value includes one subject who proposed the abstract idea of finding an open pas- 
sage through which the rays could be directed at the tumor, but who failed to suggest 
the esophagus or any other concrete possibility as a route. 
.Ol. Eighty percent of subjects in the Tunnel conditions produced opera- 
tion solutions, as opposed to 43% of subjects in all other conditions, 
G2(1) = 4.29, p < .05. 
Ratings of stories as solution prompts. As we noted earlier, we initially 
used our own intuitions about the semantic parallels between the military 
and the medical solutions to predict the radiation solutions that would be 
triggered by the various story analogies. In order to assess whether sub- 
jects shared our intuitions we administered a rating task to 51 under- 
graduates, none of whom previously knew of any solutions to the radia- 
tion problem. For each of the three stories used in Experiment I, 17 
subjects first read the story, then the radiation problem, and finally the six 
possible solution proposals listed in Table 4. Subjects rated each of the 
proposals (which were listed in a random order) on a 9-point scale as to 
how likely they thought it was that the story they had just read would 
make them think of the proposed solution. A rating of 9 indicated 
maximum likelihood that the story would suggest the solution. Subjects 
were instructed not to consider the practicality of the various solutions in 
making their judgments. 
The mean ratings are presented in Table 4. Note that proposal 1 is the 
dispersion solution, 2 is the open passage solution, and 3 and 4 are opera- 
tion solutions. Proposals 5 and 6 are two other fairly common suggestions 
that we expected would be relatively unrelated to all of the three stories. 
(Proposal 5 is a type of “accumulation” solution, which will be discussed 
in connection with Experiment III). The proposal ratings differed greatly 
depending on which story subjects had read, F(10,240) = 8.84, p < .OOl. 
For each story analogy, Newman-Keuls tests were performed on the 
differences among the ratings for the six proposals. In the case of the 
322 GICK AND HOLYOAK 
TABLE 4 
Mean Ratings of Likelihood that Stories Would Help to 
Think of Various Radiation Solutions” 
Proposed solutions 
1. Apply low-intensity rays from several different directions so they simultaneously 
converge at the tumor. 
2. Send high-intensity rays down the esophagus so they strike the tumor. 
3. Insert a tube through the healthy tissue to the tumor, and then send high- 
intensity rays through the tube to the tumor. 
4. Make an incision into the stomach to expose the tumor, and then apply high- 
intensity rays directly to the tumor. 
5. Treat the person with low-intensity rays, repeating the treatment a number of 
times. 
6. Treat the person with medium-intensity rays. 
Solution number 
story 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Atack-Dispersion 8.41 2.53 3.71 2.94 4.88 3.47 
Open Supply Route 3.59 6.65 5.82 4.58 2.94 2.29 
Tunnel 5.12 4.47 6.47 5.35 2.71 1.82 
(1 A rating of 9 indicated maximum likelihood that the story would suggest the solution. 
Attack-Dispersion story, subjects gave higher ratings to the dispersion 
solution than to any other (p < .Ol). For the Open Supply Route story, the 
open passage solution received the highest rating, although it did not 
differ significantly from the ratings given the two operation solutions. 
However, these three solutions were all rated significantly higher than 
any of the others (p < .05). For the Tunnel story, the “insert a tube” 
solution (proposal 3) received the highest rating, followed by the other 
operation solution (proposal 4), the dispersion solution, and the open 
passage solution. These four proposals did not differ significantly from 
each other. However, the two operation solutions received significantly 
higher ratings than proposals 5 and 6 (p < .05). 
The fact that subjects gave the highest rating of all to the Attack- 
Dispersion story as a prompt for the dispersion solution is consistent with 
the fact that this story appeared to be the most effective analogy in Ex- 
periment I. The overlap in the ratings for the solutions analogous to the 
Open Supply Route and Tunnel stories (proposals 2, 3, and 4) also reflects 
trends in the observed solution frequencies (see Table 3). Among the 
three story conditions, the Open Supply Route condition produced the 
second highest frequency of operation solutions, while the Tunnel condi- 
tion produced the second highest frequency of open passage solutions. 
Notice that both types of solutions involve avoiding contact between the 
rays and the healthy tissue, by directing the rays through an unobstructed 
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route. The basic difference between the two solution types is simply that 
the open passage solution makes use of a preexisting route (the 
esophagus), while the operation solutions require that the route be con- 
structed (by some type of operation). 
At first glance the relatively high rating given to the Tunnel story as a 
prompt for the dispersion solution is more puzzling, since digging a tunnel 
seems very disanalogous to dispersion of rays. In fact, however, as Table 
3 indicates, two subjects in the Tunnel condition actually did produce the 
relatively rare dispersion solution. Furthermore, as we will see when we 
discuss the protocols in more detail below, both of these subjects also 
spontaneously suggested that the general might have sent his army down 
multiple roads. Recall that the identical first paragraphs of all three stories 
contain the enabling conditions for the dispersion solution. However, in 
the Open Supply Route story the given solution involves use of only one 
road, which may create a set effect that blocks consideration of how 
multiple roads might be used. In contrast, the solution given in the Tunnel 
story avoids use of the roads altogether. Since some kind of attack by 
road is nonetheless an obvious possibility, the stated enabling conditions 
may lead subjects who read the Tunnel story to think of the alternative 
solution of using multiple roads, which in turn could prompt the disper- 
sion solution to the radiation problem. While some aspects of the above 
analysis are certainly speculative, it seems clear that subjects in the rating 
task were highly sensitive to factors that actually influenced the effective- 
ness of the story analogies in Experiment I. 
Frequencies of other solutions. The possibility of a set effect, men- 
tioned above, raises the general issue of whether story analogies actually 
block generation of qualitatively different solution proposals. To investi- 
gate this question an analysis of variance was performed on the total 
number of proposed solutions, other than the primary analogous solution, 
that were given by subjects in the various conditions. That is, dispersion 
solutions were excluded for the Attack-Dispersion condition, open pas- 
sage solutions were excluded for the Open Supply Route condition, oper- 
ation solutions were excluded for the Tunnel condition, while none of the 
above solutions were excluded for the control condition. In addition, a 
small number of proposals (a mean of 0.4 per subject) that did not involve 
use of the rays at all (e.g., Laetrile treatment) were excluded for all 
conditions. 
The average number of nonanalogous solutions produced was 1.10 for 
the Attack-Dispersion condition, 1.60 for the Open Supply Route condi- 
tion, 2.70 for the Tunnel condition, and 2.00 for the control condition, 
F(3,36) = 4.17, p < .025. Newman-Keuls tests revealed that only the 
difference between the Tunnel and Attack-Dispersion conditions was sig- 
nificant (p < .Ol). As we noted earlier, subjects in the Tunnel condition 
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tended to produce a relatively high number of open passage and disper- 
sion solutions. The rating results (Table 4) also indicated that the Tunnel 
story is a moderately effective prompt for several different solutions. The 
trends toward fewer alternative proposals in the Attack-Dispersion and 
Open Supply Route conditions, compared to the control condition, at 
least suggest the possibility of some kind of set effect. 
In order to obtain further evidence regarding a possible set effect, the 
frequencies of specific radiation solutions, other than those analogous to 
the various stories, were tabulated for each condition. The solutions ex- 
amined were proposals to treat the healthy tissue directly, rather than 
altering the route that the rays take. Specifically, these solutions 
suggested decreasing the sensitivity of the healthy tissue to the rays (e.g., 
by a chemical injection, or building up a tolerance to the rays), or covering 
the healthy tissue with a barrier to protect it from the rays (e.g., by 
inserting a lead shield to protect the healthy tissue). Such solutions were 
produced by 30% of the subjects in the control condition, 10% of the 
subjects in the Tunnel condition, and none of the subjects in the Attack- 
Dispersion and Open Supply conditions. While the numbers involved 
were too small to be statistically reliable, these results suggest that an 
analogy may tend to block generation of alternative types of solutions. 
Practicality and creativity ratings. The practicality and creativity rat- 
ings that subjects gave for their own solutions were examined. Within 
each story condition, the ratings given to the analogous solution were 
compared to the means of the ratings given to other solutions by the same 
subjects. In the Attack-Dispersion condition seven subjects produced and 
rated the dispersion solution and at least one other proposal. The disper- 
sion solution was rated as much more practical than other solutions (1.43 
versus 4.64), F(1,6) = 27.2, p < .Ol. However, the creativity ratings did 
not differ significantly between the dispersion solution and other propos- 
als (3.43 versus 3.64), F < 1. It seems likely that subjects did not perceive 
their dispersion solutions as especially creative because they were aware 
of using the prior story to generate an analogous solution. 
Parallel analyses for the Open Supply Route and Tunnel conditions 
revealed no significant differences. Collapsing over subjects in all condi- 
tions, the dispersion solution tended to be rated as most practical (a mean 
of 2.0), followed by the open passage (3.9) and operation solutions (5.4). 
We also asked an independent group of 20 undergraduates (none of 
whom previously knew of the radiation problem) to choose which solution 
was more practical: the dispersion solution (“apply low-intensity rays 
from several different directions so they simultaneously converge at the 
tumor”), or the open passage solution (“send high-intensity rays down 
the esophagus so they strike the tumor”). Fifteen of the twenty subjects 
selected the dispersion solution as more practical @ < .05 by a sign test). 
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When asked to justify their decision, 11 of these 15 mentioned the prob- 
lem of preventing the rays from destroying the tissue lining the esophagus. 
It may be that some subjects in Experiment I implicitly generated the 
open passage solution (or an operation solution) on the basis of the rele- 
vant story analogy, but then failed to mention it (despite the instruction to 
mention any possibility) because they recognized its inadequacy. We will 
consider other sources of difficulty in using the Open Supply Route and 
Tunnel stories below, when subjects’ protocols are discussed in more 
detail. 
Problem-solving protocols. The results discussed so far demonstrate 
that story analogies can play a major role in directing the problem-solving 
process. However, they reveal little about the process by which subjects 
arrive at an analogous solution. We therefore supplemented the quantita- 
tive analysis of solution types, reported above, with a more qualitative 
analysis of subjects’ problem-solving protocols. Several aspects of the 
protocols were examined. Occasions when the experimenter prompted 
the subjects to use the story were noted, as were correspondences be- 
tween the story and the target problem that subjects mentioned in the 
course of generating solutions. This analysis was, of course, constrained 
by the overall quality and quantity of the protocols. For example, some 
subjects insisted that talking aloud hindered their thinking, and con- 
sequently did not say very much. Rather than presenting an exhaustive 
analysis of all the protocols, we will therefore concentrate on particularly 
suggestive excerpts. While this type of protocol analysis has obvious 
limitations, it may at least provide some hints about the process of 
analogical problem solving, and in fact served in part to motivate sub- 
sequent experiments. 
A major issue, raised earlier, concerns the degree of mapping subjects 
perform in the process of generating an analogous solution. Do subjects 
make use of detailed correspondences between the story and the target 
problem, or do they focus directly on the solution embedded in the story 
and attempt to apply it to the target problem? Of the 10 subjects in the 
Attack-Dispersion condition, 7 produced the dispersion solution without 
any prompt, and 3 produced it after being prompted to refer back to the 
story. In some respects the protocols for prompted subjects are poten- 
tially more informative, since what such subjects say is more likely to 
reflect an ongoing solution process, rather than the result of a process 
already completed. The protocols of 2 of the 3 prompted subjects 
suggested use of a solution-focusing strategy. 
Table 5 presents an excerpt from the protocol of one of these subjects, 
S15. After the prompt to use the story, this subject clearly focuses on the 
solution of dividing up the army into groups and immediately generates 
the parallel solution to the radiation problem. There is no apparent map- 
326 GICK AND HOLYOAK 
TABLE 5 
Portion of Protocol for Sl5 (Attack-Dispersion Condition) 
Subject reads radiation problem. 
S: Alright I, what I most, what I’d probably do is send in the ray at sufficiently 
high intensity and then taking the risk that the tissues, the healthy tissues 
that would be destroyed, could be repaired later on. Trying to relate this 
to the other problem, I could say that you could give multiple treatments 
of low-intensity ray. But from this problem it seems that they won’t have 
effect on the tumor so . . . so I don’t think that would work. 
Later . . . 
E: Okay. And as a last question can you give me a, tell me ways in which your 
solution would satisfy the constraints of the experiment? 
S: What are the constraints of the experiment? 
E: Okay, i.e., that the healthy tissue will not be destroyed, and the tumor will be? 
S: Alright, in that way my first suggestion would probably not be the way to go 
at it. Because that way you’re getting low intensity so it won’t destroy the 
tissue and hopefully over a period of time the additive effect of low-intensity 
rays would kill the tumor. But from reading the article, I don’t know if that 
would work or not, because it says that a low-intensity ray doesn’t have any 
effect on the tumor at all. So I don’t know. I don’t know any other possible 
ways of doing it. 
E: Would it help to possibly go back to the story and see whether you can 
apply that? 
S: Well, that’s what I was trying to do here. It says here he divides his army 
into different small groups. Okay, may . . . possibly. What they could do, 
but this is a whole new solution now, possibly what they could do is attack 
the tumor from a multiple of directions with lower intensity rays and then, 
since you’re coming in from all different directions, the healthy, with small- 
intensity rays you’re not going to be destroying the healthy tissue but you’re, 
and they’ll all converge at the point of the tumor which will hopefully 
destroy the tumor. 
ping between the initial problem stated in the story and the target 
problem. 
Notice also that the solution S 15 proposes prior to the prompt involves 
the idea of applying many low-intensity rays. After the prompt, the sub- 
ject produces the dispersion solution by augmenting this aspect of the 
earlier solution with the idea of sending rays from many angles. This 
pattern of gradual solution development was also evident in the protocol 
of another prompted subject in the Attack-Dispersion condition. In such 
cases it appears that the subjects were working in the appropriate direc- 
tion (in the sense of Maier, 1930) prior to producing the complete disper- 
sion solution. That is, at first they seemed to have the abstract idea that 
the solution should involve reducing the intensity of the rays on the way 
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to the tumor, but only later were able to develop a concrete solution 
satisfying the problem constraints. S15 appeared to use the story analogy 
to develop the early partial solution; however, other subjects apparently 
generated an abstract partial solution independently of the analogy. 
The details of the problem-solving process are less evident in the pro- 
tocols of the seven unprompted subjects, since they expressed the solu- 
tion all at once. Three of these subjects simply stated the solution and 
alluded to the usefulness of the prior story (saying, for example, “consid- 
ering the problem before”). These subjects did not mention any specific 
correspondences between the story and the target problem, and hence 
their protocols were quite unrevealing with respect to the solution pro- 
cess. 
However, two other unprompted subjects did spontaneously mention 
correspondences between the problems. Immediately after reading the 
radiation problem, S23 stated: 
Like in the first problem, the impenetrable fortress, the guy had put bombs all 
around, and the bombs could be compared to the destruction of healthy tissue. 
And so they had to, they couldn’t go in in mass through one road, they had to split 
up so as not to destroy the healthy tissue. Because if there’s only a little bit of ray 
it doesn’t damage the tissue, but it’s all focused on the same spot. 
Table 6 presents a portion of the protocol for S28, another unprompted 
subject. This subject’s protocol is particularly interesting because he 
claimed that he generated the dispersion solution on the basis of an anal- 
ogy between the radiation problem and an actual problem he had read 
about the previous night (using lasers to fuse the filament in a lightbulb 
without breaking the glass). This may be an unanticipated instance of the 
use of a “real world” analogy to solve a problem. However, when later 
questioned by the experimenter, S28 clearly was also aware of corre- 
spondences between the radiation problem and the prior story’. It is 
therefore uncertain which analogy initially triggered generation of the 
dispersion solution. Also note that at the beginning of this excerpt S28 
remarks that the dispersion solution made it hard to think of alternative 
solutions, suggesting that he was aware of a set effect. No other subject 
explicitly mentioned such an inhibitory effect of the prior story. 
It is clear in the above two cases that the subjects noticed some corre- 
spondences involving the initial conditions and constraints of the story 
and target problem. However, it is difficult to tell whether these aspects of 
the mapping process were instrumental in generating the analogous solu- 
tion, or whether subjects simply mentioned the correspondences to justify 
the adequacy of the solution, after it had already been generated. In 
general it was not clear what particular correspondences were central to 
the solution process. However, several subjects alluded to the importance 
of the phrase “like spokes on a wheel.” Recall that the existence of 
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TABLE 6 
Portion of Protocol for S28 (Attack-Dispersion Condition) 
Subject reads radiation problem and states dispersion solution. Experimenter asks for other 
solutions and subject suggests operating to expose tumor. 
S: I like my first solution so much that it’s hard to come up with any others. 
E: Can you tell me how you arrived at your first solution? 
S: To tell you the truth I was thinking about that problem last night. 
(Experiment asks for clarification). 
S: I remembered reading an ad at one time on one. Some company has really 
expensive lightbulbs and when the filament breaks inside it’s really expensive 
to replace the lightbulb so what they do is take lasers from all different 
angles and, like shooting through they don’t disturb the glass but when they 
concentrate they fuse the filament. 
E: Oh, I see, very interesting. 
S: A... other than that I would, I really couldn’t, don’t think I could come up 
with other solutions. 
E: Okay, can you tell me whether you applied any of the hints from the previous 
story at all? 
S: Yeah, I would say, yeah, the fortress is similar to the tumor and the army is 
the same as X rays or rays that destroy the tumor, and they cannot all pass 
through the organism, i.e., countryside, at the same time or they blow up. 
multiple routes is a critical enabling condition for the solution embodied in 
the Attack-Dispersion story, and it has no explicit parallel in the state- 
ment of the radiation problem. This aspect of the story analogy may 
therefore serve to generate the critical insight that it is possible to send 
rays from multiple directions. One illustrative example is the following 
excerpt from the protocol of S7 in the Attack-Dispersion condition, which 
begins immediately after the subject had read the radiation problem: 
Well, I already know the answer. I knew it when I read it. I might as well stop and 
say that. What you do is you have a bunch of rays that are weaker, and you point 
them so that they concentrate on one point. So you just have many different 
angles. It could not only be two dimensional, the analogy of the spokes on the 
fortress. But you could even have it three dimensional, so you could have a whole 
ball of spokes going in. And you would have a high intensity right at the tumor. 
In addition, the protocols of all three subjects in the Open Supply Route 
and Tunnel conditions who produced the dispersion solution suggested 
that it was triggered by the idea of multiple converging routes. For exam- 
ple, immediately after S2 in the Open Supply Route condition read the 
problem, she expressed the idea of using a “circular approach” (which in 
her earlier story summary she explicitly related to the phrase “spokes on 
a wheel”). This idea then led to the multidirectional aspect of the disper- 
sion solution to the radiation problem. 
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Two subjects in the Tunnel condition who produced the dispersion 
solution did so after first spontaneously remarking that the general might 
have sent his men down multiple roads. One other subject, in the Open 
Supply Route condition, also suggested the dispersion solution to the 
military problem, but failed to apply it to the radiation problem. The use 
of self-generated solutions to help solve an analogous problem will be 
investigated more systematically in Experiment III. 
Subjects’ protocols also provided information about some of the dif- 
ficulties they encountered in attempting to apply analogies based on the 
Open Supply Route and Tunnel stories. As we pointed out earlier, the 
open passage solution is not especially practical and some subjects may 
have thought of this solution without mentioning it. For example, S32 in 
the Tunnel condition gave the open passage solution as an afterthought at 
the very end of the interview, and also outlined the problems with it: that 
the esophagus is not straight, and that there would be “refraction off the 
esophagal walls, or absorption of the rays,” which would destroy tissue. 
Three subjects attempted to overcome this difficulty by suggesting that a 
ray-proof tube through which the rays could be directed should be in- 
serted down the throat. 
In addition, the nature of the analogy suggested by the Open Supply 
Route story is somewhat different from that suggested by the other two 
stories. The solutions embodied in both of the latter stories suggest pro- 
cedures that can be used to generate parallel solutions to the radiation 
problem (dividing the rays in the case of the Attack-Dispersion story, 
operating in the case of the Tunnel story). In contrast, the Open Supply 
Route story only suggests that an existing open passage might be used. 
The subject must then search memory to find a concrete example of such 
an open passage to the stomach (e.g., the esophagus). Applying the anal- 
ogy thus involves two steps: mapping the abstract idea of an open passage 
from the story to the target problem, and then thinking of a concrete 
example of such a passage. The difficulty of applying the analogy may 
account for the fact that four of the seven subjects in the Open Supply 
Route condition who gave the open passage solution had to be prompted 
to use the story. 
Table 7 presents a portion of the protocol for S19 in the Open Supply 
Route condition. This subject works through a rather detailed mapping of 
the correspondences between the story and the radiation problem. But 
while she clearly develops the abstract idea of finding an open passage, 
she fails in the attempt to think of a concrete example. The partial solution 
produced by S19 can be contrasted with the complete lack of success 
apparent in the protocol of S37 in the Open Supply Route condition: 
The only thing that is apparent to me is that the general had other information that 
he knew that one of the thoroughfares would be left open, and so he was able to 
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TABLE 7 
Portion of Protocol for S19 (Open Supply Route Condition) 
E: It might help if you reread the instructions here. This part. 
(S rereads radiation problem.) 
S: Okay, so what was the first problem? The spokes of the wheel-right? 
E: Right. 
S: So the center fortress deal would be the idea of the tumor. That’s . . . 
E: Okay. 
S: And then the spokes that blow up a little would be like the healthy tissue 
that blows up a little bit. And so with that one the guy had one route that 
was gonna do it. I guess in this one that’s what you have to do is find the one 
route that would work. 
E: Okay. 
S: And, I think, and not use the other ways. 
E: Okay. What would that be? 
S: That would mean we have to find one approach that was going to get to the 
tumor without getting the healthy tissue. And I don’t see how you could do 
that. Cause it’s not-it doesn’t seem like it’s the same thing. 
E: What doesn’t seem like the same thing? 
S: Well the idea that road, with a road its possible to have one road unguarded 
but without, in your body there’s always going to be, unless the tumor was 
right on the outside, there would always be some tissue you would have to go 
through to get to it. 
use that. But, unless the doctor had some new information or some other treat- 
ment, I don’t see any other applications from the first problem to the second 
problem. 
Notice that S37 appears to have mapped the story and the target prob- 
lem at a very abstract level of macrostructure, so that the perceived 
analogy (the general had new information, so perhaps the doctor might 
also) was too vague to yield a specific solution proposal for the radiation 
problem. 
In the case of the Tunnel condition four of the eight subjects who 
generated operation solutions received a prompt to use the story before 
they did so. Some subjects may have been reluctant to suggest an opera- 
tion solution because they were aware that it violated a constraint given in 
the problem statement.4 An excerpt from the protocol of S24, presented in 
Table 8, illustrates the kind of difficulty encountered in this condition. 
The protocol suggests that the subject was quite carefully mapping com- 
ponents of the story onto components of the radiation problem. However, 
4 Actually, some subjects pointed out that the problem statement is somewhat vague on 
this point. The statement that “it is impossible to operate on the patient” might be inter- 
preted as meaning only that it is impossible to operate and remove the tumor, rather than 
that an operation of any kind is impossible. However, protocols and practicality ratings 
indicated that most subjects who suggested operating to expose the tumor considered the 
proposal dubious at best. 
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TABLE 8 
Portion of Protocol for S24 (Tunnel Condition) 
E: If  you read your instructions, it says that this story might give you some 
hints . . . What are you thinking? 
S: Well, I remember that the main way they solved this problem was they dug 
under the fortress and went around it. So, possibly in this situation, you 
could go around the healthy tissue. I don’t know how you’d do that 
I see an analogy, it’s not real clear. 
E: Why isn’t it clear? 
S: Because when I picture healthy tissue in my mind, healthy tissue all over 
and, you know, just like a tumor in between all this healthy tissue. But here, 
the mines they’re on top near the surface of the ground, so they can, you can 
dig under those and you won’t really have any problem. But here no matter 
where you go, like a circle around the healthy tissue . . . maybe an operation. 
E: Except that one of the constraints of the experiment says that you can’t 
operate. 
S: Okay, that’s not possible . . . maybe . . . I was thinking that maybe you could 
give intervals of high intensity, but I don’t know, that still would probably 
destroy the healthy tissue. 
E: Can you think of anything else? . . . Is this problem, the previous story, is 
that distracting? 
S: (mumbles) Again, I’m looking for an analogy between the two. And kind of 
set up the same problem and solve it the same way, but I don’t know if I can 
or not. 
E: So, can you think of any other possibilities? 
S: (long pause) No. 
the subject was unable to generate a satisfying parallel solution to the 
target problem. 
The overall impression created by the problem-solving protocols is that 
the generation of analogous solutions involves a conscious process of 
mapping correspondences between the story and the target problem. The 
degree of mapping required seems to vary a great deal. Sometimes mapping 
was done in considerable detail, particularly if the subject was having 
difficulty producing a parallel solution. In other cases noticing one or two 
major points of correspondence seemed sufficient to generate the solution. 
In some instances, particularly for dispersion and open passage solutions, 
aspects of the solution were clearly generated in sequential steps. 
The protocols of control subjects differed in several ways from those of 
subjects in the story conditions. Control subjects more often were 
prompted to talk. Sometimes they seemed confused and asked if there 
really was a solution to the problem. In addition, control subjects received 
fewer prompts to clarify their solutions. The latter finding raises the ques- 
tion of the extent to which the use of story analogies may depend on 
verbal or nonverbal feedback from the experimenter. Since a primary 
concern in Experiment I was to obtain interpretabie oral protocols, a 
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considerable amount of probing by the experimenter was essential. How- 
ever, it would clearly be desirable to demonstrate that people can use 
analogies to generate problem solutions without interacting with the ex- 
perimenter. Experiment II was designed to serve this purpose, and also to 
provide additional information about the degree of mapping required to 
produce a solution on the basis of a story analogy. 
EXPERIMENT II 
In order to avoid any possibility that subjects could be led to a particu- 
lar solution by the experimenter, Experiment II used a noninteractive 
procedure in which story analogies and the radiation problem were ad- 
ministered in booklet form. Experiment II was also designed to assess the 
degree of mapping required to generate a solution on the basis of an 
analogy. For this purpose different subjects were given one of two 
matched stories. While both stories embodied the same solution (the dis- 
persion solution), they differed in the degree of correspondence that 
existed between their problem statements and the radiation problem. If 
correspondences between the problem statements play an important role 
in generating a parallel solution to the target problem, lessening the degree 
of analogy between the story problem and the radiation problem should 
reduce the probability that subjects will be able to use the story to pro- 
duce the analogous solution. 
Method 
Materials. The stories used in Experiment II were the Attack-Dispersion story (ver- 
sion 2) and the Parade-Dispersion story (see Appendix II). Table 9 presents a schematic 
outline of the Parade-Dispersion story, which can be compared to the outlines of the 
Attack-Dispersion story and radiation problem (Table 2). The Attack-Dispersion story used 
in Experiment II is essentially identical to that used in Experiment I. The story was rewritten 
slightly to match it as closely as possible with the Parade story in length and wording. Note 
that the setting information is nearly the same in the Attack and Parade stories. In particular, 
the critical enabling conditions for the dispersion solution (centrally located fortress, multi- 
ple roads radiating outward) are present in both stories. In addition, the second paragraphs 
of the two stories, which describe the general’s dispersion solution, are identical (except for 
the tinal sentences, which state the goal that has been achieved). 
However, the problem statement for the Parade story is substantially different from that 
for the Attack story, and it is disanalogous to the radiation problem. In the Parade story the 
genera1 is not trying to attack the dictator in the fortress, but rather to stage a parade that 
meets the dictator’s specifications. The constraint of the mined roads has been removed; and 
use of the entire army is required not to produce a sufftciently strong assault, but rather to 
produce a sufficiently impressive display. The problem statements of the Parade story and of 
the radiation problem are thus disanalogous in several respects. The Parade problem lacks 
the basic element of “desire to overcome a target object.” The basis of the constraint against 
sending the entire army down one road (the genera1 would lose his rank) does not parallel the 
basis of the constraint against using high-intensity rays (healthy tissue would be destroyed). 
Only the setting information and the constraint against sending the full army down one route 
remain analogous to features of the radiation problem. Accordingly, the mapping process 
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TABLE 9 
Schematic Outline of Parade-Dispersion Story 
Problem statement 
Problem setting General has army. 
Country has dictator. 




Roads radiate from fortress like spokes on a wheel. 
Produce impressive parade that can be seen and heard 
throughout entire country. 
Sending entire army down one road fails to produce impres- 
sive parade. 
If  parade fails to impress dictator, general will lose his rank. 
Solution 
Dispersion Divide up parade so that each part of country sees part of 
parade. 
Use 
Resulting goal state 
(1) Many small groups of men 
(2) From different directions 
(3) Simultaneously 
Parade seen and heard simultaneously throughout country. 
General preserves his rank. 
subjects can perform in order to use the Parade story to generate the radiation dispersion 
solution will be limited by the lack of correspondence between the problem statements for 
the story and the target problem. 
As in the Attack story, the general in the Parade story solves his problem by dividing his 
troops and sending them down multiple roads to the fortress. But in the Parade story the 
procession of soldiers to the fortress directly constitutes achievement of the goal state, 
whereas in the Attack story the movement of troops is simply the means by which the final 
goal (capture of the fortress) is achieved. Furthermore, in the Parade story the fact that the 
troops converge on the fortress is a more or less incidental aspect of the solution procedure, 
whereas in the Attack story this aspect of the solution is critical. Thus even though the 
surface description of the solution is the same in both stories, the solution contexts differ. 
Such contextual differences may influence the precise interpretation subjects give to the 
solution. 
In order to assess whether the Parade and Attack stories in fact suggest similar solutions 
to the radiation problem, two independent groups of 17 undergraduates rated the stories as 
prompts for various radiation solutions. (The Parade story was simply included as an addi- 
tional condition in the story rating task discussed under Results of Experiment I.) The six 
solutions that were rated are listed in Table 4. While there was a slight trend for the Attack 
story to be rated higher than the Parade story as a prompt for the dispersion solution, the two 
stories did not produce significantly different ratings, either as a main effect, F < 1, or as an 
interaction, F(.5,160) = 1.32, p > .25. These rating results thus confirm that the two stories, 
despite the differences in their problem statements, suggest essentially the same solution to 
the radiation problem. Experiment II was designed to determine whether subjects actually 
solving the radiation problem would be hindered by a disanalogous problem statement. 
Procedure and subjects. Subjects were divided into three conditions, receiving 
either the Attack story, the Parade story, or no story (control condition) prior to working on 
334 GICK AND HOLYOAK 
the radiation problem. The test booklet consisted of instructions, story analogy (for experi- 
mental conditions), radiation problem, a solution sheet, and a final questionnaire, each on a 
separate page. Experimental subjects first read the story and then wrote a brief summary of 
it, referring back to the story if they wished. All subjects then attempted to solve the 
radiation problem. Subjects in the experimental conditions were told that the first story 
might give them some hints for solving the test problem, although it was not necessary to use 
the prior story to solve the problem. They were allowed to refer back to the story at any 
time. All subjects were instructed to write as many solutions as possible in the order they 
came to mind. They were asked to write down every idea they considered, even those later 
rejected. Subjects were told to make their proposals as explicit as possible, but not to be 
concerned with technical medical considerations. The final questionnaire asked subjects to 
indicate how helpful the story problem was in solving the radiation problem (“not helpful,” 
“somewhat helpful,” or “very helpful”), and in what way it was helpful. Subjects were also 
asked if they had known the solution to the radiation problem prior to the experiment. 
Subjects were 143 undergraduates tested in five introductory psychology classes. Forty- 
seven subjects served in the Attack-Dispersion condition, 46 in the Parade-Dispersion con- 
dition, and 50 in the control condition. 
Results and Discussion 
The data for one subject in the Parade-Dispersion condition who was 
familiar with the radiation problem and dispersion solution were dis- 
carded. The remaining subjects’ solution proposals were analyzed for the 
presence of various solution types, particularly the dispersion solution. 
This analysis was done by two independent scorers, each blind to the 
conditions in which subjects served. Disagreements were resolved by 
discussion. Unlike subjects in Experiment I, subjects in Experiment II 
were not prompted to fully explicate their solutions. As a result, a number 
of subjects produced incomplete versions of the dispersion solution. In 
order to be scored as a complete dispersion solution, three features had to 
be present in the proposal: (1) the rays are applied to the tumor from 
different directions, (2) at low intensity, and (3) simultaneously. A partial 
solution had to contain at least the first feature, the critical element of 
dispersion. However, partial solutions might omit features 2 and/or 3. In 
addition, a partial solution might include reference to some degree of 
damage to healthy tissue. Presence of the latter feature was taken as an 
indication that the subject did not entirely understand the implications of 
the dispersion solution, since the problem statement specified that low- 
intensity rays are harmless. 
The percentage of subjects producing complete or partial dispersion 
solutions differed substantially across the three conditions, as shown in 
Table 10. Dispersion solutions were produced by 76% of the subjects in 
the Attack-Dispersion condition, 49% of the subjects in the Parade- 
Dispersion condition, and only 8% of the subjects in the control condition, 
G2(2) = 53.1, p < .OOl. The Attack story produced significantly more 
dispersion solutions than did the Parade story, G2(2) = 7.70, p < .Ol, 
while the two story conditions together produced significantly more dis- 
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TABLE 10 
Percentage of Subjects in Each Condition of Experiment II Who Proposed 
the Dispersion Solution to the Radiation Problem 
Dispersion solution 






57 19 76 47 
31 18 49 45 
8 0 8 50 
persion solutions than did the control condition, GZ(l) = 45.5, p < .OOl. 
The Attack story also prompted more complete dispersion solutions than 
did the Parade story. The four subjects in the control condition who 
spontaneously generated dispersion solutions gave complete solutions. 
Collapsing over all conditions, dispersion solutions tended to be produced 
relatively early in the sequence of proposals given by a subject (i.e., prior 
to the proposal of median rank, p < .025 by a sign test). 
Table 11 presents the percentage of subjects in the two story conditions 
who rated the story as “not helpful,” “somewhat helpful,” or “very 
helpful,” as a function of whether the subject produced a complete dis- 
persion solution, partial solution, or no dispersion solution. The results 
obtained with such post-hoc questionnaires must be interpreted with cau- 
tion, since they may reflect hindsight rather than accurate memories of 
the solution process. Nevertheless, these rating results are at least a 
source of converging evidence. Most subjects who produced a dispersion 
solution rated the story as “very helpful.” In contrast, the majority of 
those subjects in both conditions who failed to produce a dispersion solu- 
tion rated the story as “not helpful at all.” There were no reliable differ- 
ences between the rating patterns produced by subjects in the Attack 
versus Parade conditions. 
The total number of proposed solutions (other than the dispersion solu- 
tion) was tabulated for subjects in each of the three conditions. The mean 
number of proposals was 1.17 for the Attack condition, 1.40 for the 
Parade condition, and 2.12 for the control condition, F(2,139) = 12.7, p < 
.OOl. A Newman-Keuls test indicated that only the difference between 
the control condition and the two story conditions was significant, p < 
.Ol. This decline in the number of alternative proposals given by subjects 
prompted to generate the dispersion solution replicated the comparable 
trend obtained in Experiment I. 
As in Experiment I, the frequency of a specific class of alternative 
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somehow protecting the tissue) was tabulated for each condition. 
Whereas 28% of the subjects in the control condition produced such solu- 
tions, only 2% of those in the Attack condition and 16% of those in the 
Parade condition did so, G2(2) = 14.6, p < .Ol. Subjects in the Parade 
condition produced more solutions of this type than did subjects in the 
Attack condition, G2(1) = 5.78, p < .02. This result is a significant repli- 
cation of a trend obtained in Experiment I: the more effective the story 
analogy is in prompting the analogous solution, the more it inhibits pro- 
duction of .alternative, disanalogous proposals. 
The basic results of Experiment II are thus extremely clear. First, 
subjects can readily use story analogies to guide their attempts to solve 
the radiation problem, even without feedback from the experimenter. 
Second, the effectiveness of analogies in prompting a specific solution is a 
matter of degree. In particular, a story with a problem statement analo- 
gous to that of the radiation problem (the Attack story) was more likely to 
trigger the dispersion solution than was a story with a problem statement 
less related to that of the radiation problem (the Parade story). This was 
true even though both stories embodied similar setting information and 
solution statements. 
EXPERIMENT III 
Experiments I and II demonstrated that subjects can use a story anal- 
ogy, describing a problem and its solution, to guide generation of an 
analogous solution to the radiation problem. A natural question is whether 
subjects could also use their own solutions to the initial story problem to 
help them solve the target problem. You may recall that Experiment I 
provided some evidence for this possibility. Three subjects who received 
stories other than the Attack-Dispersion story spontaneously suggested 
that the general might have divided his troops and sent them down multi- 
ple roads; two of these subjects then went on to produce the dispersion 
solution to the radiation problem. Accordingly, in Experiment III subjects 
were first given just the problem statement from the Attack-Dispersion 
story, and asked to suggest what the general might do to capture the 
fortress. Subjects were then asked to solve the radiation problem, using 
their solutions to the initial problem as hints. 
Method 
The problems were administered in booklet form as in Experiment II. The instructions 
stated that the subject would have to solve “two verbal problems requiring some creativity 
for their solutions.” The first problem consisted of the first paragraph of the Attack- 
Dispersion story (version 2, Appendix II), followed by the question “What could the general 
do in order to capture the fortress. 7” Subjects were to provide as many possible solutions as 
they could think of. Following this, subjects proceeded to give solutions to the radiation 
problem. The instructions stated, “, . . you may find that the first problem that you solved 
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gives you some hints for solving the second problem, so you should try and use it if you 
can. . . However, it is not necessary to use the first problem in order to solve the second.” 
Subjects were told that they could look back to the first problem and their solutions to it at 
any time. On the final page of the booklet subjects were asked to indicate to what extent the 
first story problem helped in solving the ray problem (“not at all,” “somewhat,” “very 
much”), and in what way it was helpful. They were also asked to indicate if they had known 
the solution to the radiation problem prior to the experiment. 
The experiment was administered to 46 students in two introductory psychology classes. 
Results and Discussion 
Data from one subject who indicated prior knowledge of the dispersion 
solution to the radiation problem were discarded. The frequencies of vari- 
ous solutions to the two problems were tabulated for the remaining 45 
subjects by two independent scorers; disagreements were resolved by 
discussion. As might be expected given the extremely loose constraints 
imposed by the problem statement, the proposed solutions to the military 
problem were quite varied. Many of these (e.g., airlifting troops into the 
fortress by balloon) had no apparent correspondence to any potential 
solution to the radiation problem. However, 22 of the 45 subjects (49%) 
produced the gist of the dispersion solution: the general should divide the 
troops into small groups and send them down different roads. 
The major question of interest was whether those subjects who pro- 
duced the dispersion solution to the military problem would be especially 
likely to then produce the dispersion solution to the radiation problem. Of 
the 22 subjects who produced the dispersion solution to the military 
problem, 9 (41%) subsequently produced either complete or partial dis- 
persion solutions to the radiation problem. Five of these subjects pro- 
duced a complete solution. In contrast, only 3 of the remaining 23 subjects 
(13%) produced this solution G2( 1) = 4.61, p < .05. Two of these subjects 
produced a complete solution. The value of 41% is significantly higher 
than the 8% of subjects who produced the dispersion solution to the 
radiation problem without any prior story problem (Control condition of 
Experiment II), G2(1) = 10.4, p < .Ol. 
The above results are correlational in nature, since subjects who ar- 
rived at the dispersion solution to the military problem did so of their own 
accord-no experimental manipulation determined the subjects that 
would produce the critical solution. It could therefore be argued that 
subjects who produced dispersion solutions to both problems did so be- 
cause of some general factor related to problem-solving skills or 
strategies. However, additional evidence suggests that self-generated so- 
lutions to the military problem had a causal influence on generation of the 
radiation dispersion solution. First, dispersion solutions were produced 
significantly more frequently in Experiment III (regardless of whether a 
parallel solution was produced for the military problem) than in the con- 
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trol condition of Experiment II. Second, the questionnaire results also 
reflected the influence of the solutions produced for the military problem. 
Of the nine subjects who generated the dispersion solution to both prob- 
lems, all but one indicated that the military story was “somewhat” or 
“very” helpful in solving the radiation problem (one other subject did not 
respond to this question). In contrast, a majority (58%) of the remaining 
subjects indicated that the story was not helpful at all. Interestingly, two 
of the three subjects who produced the radiation dispersion solution with- 
out first producing the military dispersion solution indicated that the story 
was somewhat or very helpful (the third subject failed to answer the 
question). All three of these subjects had suggested that the general could 
send small groups in succession to the fortress. This solution may have 
triggered the idea of dividing forces that is critical to the radiation disper- 
sion solution. 
While self-generated solutions to the simpler military problem thus 
facilitated discovery of the radiation dispersion solution, the degree of 
transfer was less than perfect. The value of 41% radiation dispersion 
solutions, based on a self-generated military dispersion solution, is sig- 
nificantly less than the 76% radiation dispersion solutions produced by 
subjects given a military dispersion solution written by the experimenter 
(Attack-Dispersion condition of Experiment II), G2(1) = 8.25, p < .Ol. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this difference. Subjects 
in Experiment III almost always proposed more than one solution for the 
military problem (a mean of 3.04). Consequently, their own dispersion 
solution, if they produced it, was usually embedded in other “distractor” 
solutions. Subjects who did not systematically consider each of their pro- 
posed military solutions with respect to the radiation problem may there- 
fore have sometimes missed the critical analogy. Indeed, some subjects 
may have simply failed to apply their prior solutions at all when working 
on the radiation problem. 
In addition, it is possible that the self-generated dispersion solutions did 
not always entirely capture the analogy to the corresponding radiation 
solution. All of the self-generated dispersion solutions expressed the basic 
idea of sending small groups down multiple roads. However, in some 
versions the element of simultaneity of attack was absent or not clearly 
expressed. In other cases subjects suggested that the small groups would 
meet and regroup near the fortress prior to initiating an attack. This added 
feature of delay is disanalogous to the radiation dispersion solution (since 
low-intensity rays cannot “wait and meet up” near the tumor prior to 
striking it). Of the 22 self-generated dispersion solutions, 10 either lacked 
a clear expression of simultaneity or added the element of delay. How- 
ever, since 4 of these 10 subjects succeeded in generating the radiation 
dispersion solution, we were unable to find any effect of quality of the 
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military dispersion solution on subsequent transfer to the radiation prob- 
lem. Nonetheless, it remains possible that in various ways the subjects’ 
dispersion solutions (which were often written in a cryptic fashion) were 
incomplete in comparison with our own version of the solution. At any 
rate, it is clear that further research will be required to assess how 
problem-solving activity per se affects subsequent transfer of a solution to 
an analogous problem. 
In addition to the dispersion solution, another frequently proposed so- 
lution to the military problem was to have the general send successive 
small groups of men down a single road. This “successive groups” solu- 
tion appeared to trigger an analogous solution to the radiation problem. 
We defined proposed solutions to the latter problem that involved 
spreading out ray applications over time (regardless of the intensity of the 
rays or whether treatment was intermittent or continuous) as “accumula- 
tion” solutions. Of 24 subjects who gave the successive groups solution to 
the military problem, 10 (42%) suggested an accumulation solution to the 
radiation problem. In contrast, only 3 of the remaining 21 subjects (14%) 
suggested an accumulation solution to the radiation problem, G2(l) = 
4.28, p < .05. Furthermore, 2 of the latter 3 subjects had produced the 
dispersion solution to the military problem. Their accumulation solutions 
may therefore have been triggered by a relatively abstract analogy be- 
tween “dispersion over space” and “dispersion over time.” This possi- 
bility is supported by the fact that an accumulation solution was rated the 
second most likely (after the dispersion solution) to be prompted by the 
Attack-Dispersion story (see Table 4). 
This tendency for subjects to generate analogous accumulation solu- 
tions is particularly intersting because such proposals are clearly ineffec- 
tive solutions. Simply distributing ray treatments over time will not over- 
come the basic problem that the rays will have equal effects on both the 
tumor and the healthy tissue. Since the instructions to subjects stated that 
they should write down any proposal they could think of, even if they 
later rejected it, we do not know whether subjects who gave an accumu- 
lation solution actually believed it would work. However, this result at 
least raises the possibility that a “false analogy” between problems (sim- 
ilar to the Tunnel condition in Experiment I) may foster errors in evaluat- 
ing a parallel solution to a transfer problem. 
EXPERIMENT IV 
Our central concern in the experiments reported so far was to deter- 
mine if people can use an analogy to generate a solution to a target prob- 
lem, and to investigate how analogical problem solving proceeds. Con- 
sequently, we simplified the subjects’ task in several important ways. 
First, subjects were always allowed to reread the story analogy at any 
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time, so that their performance would not be limited by memory factors. 
Second, the story was always presented alone, so that subjects would 
have no problem identifying the relevant analogy. Third, subjects were 
always explicitly told to try to use the story as an aid in solving the target 
problem. This hint was quite nonspecific; at no time were subjects told the 
nature of the analogous relationship between the story and problem. 
Nevertheless, the hint eliminated the need for subjects to spontaneously 
notice the possible analogy. 
In many cases of everyday problem solving in which an analogy could 
help, the person would have to spontaneously notice the correspondence 
between the target problem and some analogous problem, either of which 
might be stored in memory. The two experiments reported below begin to 
investigate the effect of such additional processing requirements on 
analogical problem solving. 
Method 
In Experiment IV subjects first memorized the Attack-Dispersion story (version 3, Ap- 
pendix HIS) in the guise of a story recall experiment, and then went on to work on the 
radiation problem. In addition, subjects also first memorized two additional “distractor” 
stories written by the experimenters (“The Wine Merchants” and “The Identical Twins”; 
see Appendix IV). These additional stories were matched closely in length with the Attack- 
Dispersion story, and also describe problems and their solutions. However, the two dis- 
tractor stories were intended to be as disanalogous to the radiation problem as possible. 
The experiment was administered in booklet form to small groups of subjects. The initial 
instructions to all subjects stated that the experiment would have two parts, first a story 
recall task and then a problem-solving task. For the story recall task, subjects first received 
one story, and were given 3 min to study it. The stories were then collected, and subjects had 
up to 15 min to recall the story. They were asked to recall the story in as close to its original 
form as possible, but to give the gist of it even if they couldn’t remember the exact wording. 
All subjects completed their recall attempts within 15 min. When all subjects in a group were 
finished, the next story was distributed and the study-recall procedure was repeated. The 
stories were always administered in the order “The Wine Merchants,” the Attack Dispersion 
story (entitled “The General” for subjects), and “The Identical Twins.” The critical story 
analogy was placed in the middle serial position in order to maximize the difficulty of later 
using the memorized story to solve the radiation problem. 
Following the story recall tasks subjects were given a short (3 to 5 min) break, and then 
asked to write solutions to the radiation problem. However, subjects were divided into two 
conditions that received slightly different instructions. For subjects in the “Hint” condition, 
the instructions on solving the radiation problem included the following sentence: “In solv- 
ing this problem you may find that one of the stories you read before will give you a hint for a 
solution of this problem.” For subjects in the “No Hint” condition, this sentence was 
deleted from the instructions. The instructions used in the Hint condition were thus compa- 
rable to those used in the earlier experiments, whereas the instructions used in the No Hint 
condition for the first time did not call attention to the potential relevance of the stories to 
the target problem. 
5 The wording of the story was modified slightly in this version to match it with other story 
analogies we intended to use in a larger experimental design. For various reasons these 
additional conditions were never actually tested. 
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After completing their solution attempts subjects were given a final questionnaire. Sub- 
jects in the No Hint condition were asked whether it occurred to them “to try and use any of 
the stories from the first experiment to help solve the ray problem”; and if so, how helpful 
each of the three stories was (“not at all,” “somewhat,” “very”), and in what way. Sub- 
jects in the Hint condition answered only the latter part of the above question. All subjects 
were also asked if they had known the solution to the ray problem prior to the experiment. 
Twenty-seven undergraduates from the Human Performance Center paid subject pool 
served as paid subjects. Twelve subjects were tested in the Hint condition and fifteen in the 
No Hint condition. 
Results and Discussion 
Two independent scorers were entirely in agreement in identifying dis- 
persion solutions to the radiation problem. For the Hint condition, 11 out 
of 12 subjects (92%) produced the complete dispersion solution. This 
percentage is, of course, far higher than would be expected for subjects 
who did not receive the Attack-Dispersion story (under 10% in both Ex- 
periments I and II). In addition, 10 of the 12 subjects indicated that the 
Attack-Dispersion story was “very helpful,” one indicated that it was 
“somewhat helpful,” and one did not answer the question. In contrast, 
50% of the subjects indicated that “The Wine Merchants” was “not 
helpful at all,” and 91% (10 of 11 who answered the question) indicated 
that “The Identical Twins” was “not helpful at all.” Subjects clearly had 
no serious difficulty in identifying the critical story analogy in memory 
and applying it to generate the dispersion solution to the radiation 
problem. 
However, this picture changes dramatically when the results for the No 
Hint condition are examined. Whereas 92% of the subjects in the Hint 
condition produced the dispersion solution, only 20% (3 out of 15) of those 
in the No Hint condition did so, G2(1) = 15.5,~ < .OOl. Furthermore, 2 of 
these 3 subjects gave only partial solutions (as defined in Experiment II), 
and indicated that they did not consider using the stories. It is therefore 
possible, and in fact rather likely, that only 1 of the 15 subjects spontane- 
ously noticed the critical analogy and successfully applied it to produce 
the dispersion solution. 
In response to the questionnaire, 12 of the 15 No Hint subjects indi- 
cated that it had not occurred to them to use the stories. The 3 who said 
they did use the stories all indicated that the Attack-Dispersion story was 
“very helpful”; however, only one of these subjects actually produced 
the dispersion solution. The written comments of the other two subjects 
who said they used the Attack-Dispersion story suggested they were at 
most sensitive to some very vague, abstract analogy with the radiation 
problem. For example, one wrote that the story “showed a unique way to 
attack a problem using methods that were not very obvious or usual.” 
(Similar comments were given by subjects who rated the Wine Merchants 
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story as somewhat or very helpful.) It therefore seems that no more than 3 
subjects, and perhaps only 1, actually noticed the critical analogy without 
a hint from the experimenter. 
Since subjects were randomly assigned to the two conditions, degree of 
memory for the critical story should have been equalized across the two 
conditions. To confirm this, the protocols for the Attack-Dispersion story 
were scored for gist recall. For this purpose the story was divided into 43 
propositions (see Appendix III). This propositional division was made 
using the procedure outlined by Thorndyke (1977), with the addition that 
adjectives and prepositional phrases that seemed intuitively important to 
the story were counted as separate propositions. As anticipated, the mean 
number of propositions recalled did not differ significantly between the 
Hint and No Hint groups (32.08 versus 33.53), f < 1. 
While we did not analyze the recall in detail, a few aspects are worth 
noting. First, performance appeared quite good in an absolute sense, 
which is consistent with the fact that subjects were almost invariably 
successful in using the story to generate a solution to the radiation prob- 
lem (as long as they were told to try). Second, as many investigators of 
story recall have reported, some propositions were much more memora- 
ble than others. Three propositions were recalled by all 27 subjects. These 
were proposition 1 (“A small country was ruled by a king”) and proposi- 
tions 5 and 6 (“Many roads radiated outward from the fortress like spokes 
on a wheel”). As we argued earlier, the latter pair of propositions estab- 
lish a critical enabling condition for the general’s solution to his problem. 
This high level of recall obtained for setting information causally related 
to the solution is consistent with the problem-based model of story recall 
proposed by Black and Bower (in press). 
EXPERIMENT V 
The results of Experiment IV demonstrated that subjects can identify a 
relevant story analogy encoded into memory in the context of distractor 
stories, and can use the analogy to generate a solution to a subsequent 
target problem. However, when the experimental instructions did not 
provide a hint that the stories might help to solve the target problem, 
subjects seldom noticed or used the analogy. This suggests that the pro- 
cess of analogical problem solving is neither automatic nor invariably 
applied by college students as a conscious strategy. The knowledge ac- 
quired in the context of the story recall phase of the experiment seemed to 
be encapsulated in such a way that its pertinence to the problem-solving 
task was not recognized. 
An important question is whether this type of encapsulation of experi- 
ence is more or less absolute, or whether there are factors that would 
make a relevant analogy more likely to be noticed even though it was 
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initially encoded in a recall context. Experiment V modified the design of 
Experiment IV in order to examine two such possible factors. First, the 
total memory load was reduced by eliminating the two distractor stories 
from the recall phase; and second, in one condition the story analogy was 
presented after subjects had read and begun to work on the radiation 
problem. The latter condition can be viewed as an experimental analog of 
a situation in which a person “stumbles upon” relevant information in the 
course of working on a problem, as is often reported in anecdotes de- 
scribing the “Eureka” experiences of creative thinkers. 
Method 
The experiment was administered in booklet form as in Experiment IV. Subjects were 
assigned to one of three conditions. The initial procedure for the Story First condition was 
identical to that for the No Hint condition of Experiment IV, except that the recall task 
involved only the critical Attack-Dispersion story. After working on the radiation problem 
subjects were asked to indicate whether it had occurred to them to use the story from the 
first experiment to help solve the problem. If they responded “no,” they were then asked to 
try and use the story to generate additional solutions to the radiation problem. The proce- 
dure thus involved three steps: (1) reading and recall of the story; (2) an attempt to solve the 
radiation problem without a hint to use the story; and (3) a final attempt to solve it with a 
hint. 
The Story Second condition was presented in the guise of an “incubation” experiment. 
Subjects were told they would be given a problem to work on, then would be interrupted to 
perform a different task (story recall), and then would again work on the problem. The actual 
procedure involved four steps: (1) an initial IO-min attempt to solve the radiation problem; 
(2) reading and recall of the Attack-Dispersion story; (3) a second attempt at the radiation 
problem, without any hint to use the story; and (4) a final attempt to solve the radiation 
problem after the hint was given. This procedure thus differed from that for the Story First 
condition only by the addition of step 1, the initial attempt to solve the problem. 
If subjects in the Story Second condition were to produce more dispersion solutions than 
subjects in the Story First condition immediately after recalling the story, this would suggest 
that initial exposure to the problem makes it more likely that the person will notice a relevant 
analogy. However, one might argue that such a result could be interpreted as a real “incu- 
bation effect.” That is, regardless of the nature of the story presented during the intervening 
recall task, perhaps simply taking a break from the problem would be sufficient to increase 
the probability of generating the dispersion solution. To control for this possibility, subjects 
in the Incubation Control condition received exactly the same procedure as did those in the 
Story Second condition, except that their recall task used one of the distractor stories from 
Experiment IV (“The Identical Twins”). Accordingly, any tendency for the Incubation 
Control condition to produce more dispersion solutions after presentation of the story would 
presumably be due to a beneficial effect of incubation per se, rather than to use an analogy. 
Forty-seven undergraduates from the Human Performance Center subject pool served as 
paid subjects. Seventeen subjects were assigned to the Story First condition, 20 to the Story 
Second condition, and 10 to the Incubation Control condition. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 12 presents the percentage of subjects in each condition who 
produced the dispersion solution during the various steps of the proce- 
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TABLE 12 
Percentage of Subjects in Experiment V Who Produced Dispersion 
Solution at Each Step of the Procedure 




(with hint) Never N 
Story First - 41 35 24 17 
Story Second 10 35 30 25 20 
Incubation Control 10 0 0 90 10 
dure. There was no evidence that the manipulation of presenting the 
problem prior to the story analogy (Story Second condition) increased the 
probability that subjects would notice or use the analogy. In the Story 
First condition, 41% of the subjects gave the dispersion solution on their 
first attempt following recall of the story; while in the Story Second con- 
dition, 35% of the subjects produced this solution immediately after 
reading the story. One subject in the Story First condition gave a partial 
solution; all other solutions were complete. For the Story First condition 
we cannot clearly separate subjects who used the story to produce the 
solution from those who may have produced it spontaneously (as did 
those subjects in the Story Second condition who gave the dispersion 
solution prior to seeing the story). However, of the seven subjects in the 
Story First group who gave the dispersion solution immediately after 
story recall, six reported that they used the story to help solve the prob- 
lem. If we accept these reports at face value, it appears that the per- 
centages of subjects in the two conditions who spontaneously noticed and 
used the analogy were identical (35% in both conditions). The percentages 
of all subjects who reported that it occurred to them to use the story were 
also similar across the two conditions (47% in the Story First condition, 
40% in the Story Second condition). 
It is clear that in both conditions not all of the subjects who eventually 
proved able to use the story to generate the dispersion solution did so 
spontaneously. Collapsing over the Story First and Story Second condi- 
tions, 43% of the subjects generated the dispersion solution prior to re- 
ceiving the hint, while a total of 76% eventually succeeded in producing 
the critical solution. Note that there was a trend toward a higher percent- 
age of subjects generating the solution without a hint in Experiment V 
(43%), where no distractor stories were used, than in Experiment IV 
(20%), where two distractor stories were included in the recall task. How- 
ever, this trend was not significant, G2(1) = 2.64, p = .lO. It should be 
noted that the above comparison confounds number of distractor stories 
with serial position of the critical story (which was always presented in 
the middle position in Experiment IV). It is possible that distractor stories 
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would have a less detrimental effect on the likelihood of subjects noticing 
the analogy if the critical story were presented last, just prior to the 
problem-solving task. 
As in all previous experiments, the story analogy clearly played a crit- 
ical role in generating the dispersion solution. Whereas 76% of the sub- 
jects in the two experimental conditions eventually produced the disper- 
sion solution, only 10% (one subject) produced it in the Incubation Con- 
trol condition, G2(1) = 15.0, p < .OOl. Since the one successful subject in 
the latter group produced the target solution prior to receiving the story, 
there was not the slightest suggestion that simply taking a break from the 
problem was sufficient to stimulate discovery of the dispersion solution. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present study provides an experimental demonstration that a solu- 
tion to a problem can be developed by using an analogous problem from a 
very different domain. Our results substantiate anecdotal descriptions of 
the role that analogical thinking may play in creative problem solving, and 
at the same time provide some information about the mental processes 
involved in analogical problem solving. The results of Experiments I and 
II indicated that there is considerable variation in the degree of mapping 
required to generate an analogous solution. In particular, the intermediate 
frequency of dispersion solutions produced in Experiment II by the 
Parade story, which was only partially analogous to the radiation prob- 
lem, supports two important conclusions about the mapping process in- 
volved in analogical problem solving. First, subjects in the Parade condi- 
tion were much more likely to generate dispersion solutions than were 
control subjects. Thus it seems that subjects can often generate an analo- 
gous solution even though a complete mapping between aspects of the 
prior story and the target problem is impossible. In such cases it seems 
that a solution-focusing strategy may be sufficient to produce the parallel 
solution. Second, the Parade story was not as effective as the more com- 
pletely analogous Attack story in prompting the dispersion solution. This 
suggests that subjects can also perform a more detailed mapping between 
the problem statements of the story and of the target problem, and that 
these additional correspondences are sometimes critical in determining 
whether the subject arrives at the analogous solution. 
However, the types of correspondences between the two problem 
statements that are most critical in developing a solution are not entirely 
clear. Numerous subjects in our experiments commented on the impor- 
tance of the reference in the story to roads radiating outward “like spokes 
on a wheel.” Intuitively, this phrase seems to elicit a spatial image that 
represents those essential aspects of the dispersion solution that can be 
applied to both the military and the medical problems. Even though the 
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stories and the target problem were always presented verbally in our 
experiments, the problems essentially describe spatial relationships. Our 
use of a propositional representation to describe the correspondences 
between the stories and the radiation problem does not preclude the pos- 
sibility that some form of analog representation plays an important role in 
the mapping process. For example, the mapping process may in part 
depend on interpretive procedures that are applied to a mediating spatial 
image. Further research is needed to explore the role of spatial repre- 
sentation in analogical problem solving. 
It is clear that our understanding of the use of analogies in problem 
solving remains severely limited in many important respects. We certainly 
need to be cautious in generalizing on the basis of the present study, 
which used only one target problem and a very limited set of story 
analogies. While it seems reasonable to expect that comparable results 
would be obtained with other ill-defined “insight” problems, for which a 
solution hinges on a small number of critical inferences, this remains to be 
demonstrated. 
It is still less clear whether analogies can be used in a similar fashion to 
help solve more “computational” problems, for which the solution con- 
sists of a series of discrete steps. Reed et al. (1974) were unable to demon- 
strate positive transfer between two homomorphic “river crossing” 
problems, except when the correspondences between the arguments of 
the two problems were described to subjects. In addition, most subjects in 
the Reed et al. study reported making little or no use of the first problem 
when solving the second. It is possible that the mapping process required 
in such multimove problems places excessive demands on memory ca- 
pacity. However, various procedural differences make it difficult to di- 
rectly compare the Reed et al. results to those obtained in the present 
study. For example, subjects in the Reed et al. study solved two succes- 
sive problems, while in our experiments the solution to the first problem 
was described in the context of a story (except in Experiment III, in which 
the probability of transfering the analogous solution was somewhat re- 
duced when subjects solved the first problem themselves). In addition, it 
is possible that people are able to use analogies more easily in solving 
some computational problems than in solving others. For example, Hayes 
and Simon (1977) have demonstrated positive transfer between isomor- 
phic versions of the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, another computational prob- 
lem. Clearly much remains to be learned about the influence of problem 
characteristics on problem solving by analogy. In addition to investigating 
the effects of problem type, we need to learn more about the ways in 
which the use of analogies may interact with other strategies (e.g., 
means-ends analysis) used in problem solving. 
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Noticing and Accessing Potential Analogies 
A number of important questions for future research involve the closely 
related issues of the spontaneous noticing of analogies, and the accessing 
of potential analogies stored in memory. The results of Experiments IV 
and V suggest that one of the major blocks to successful use of an analogy 
may be failure to spontaneously notice its pertinence to the target prob- 
lem. When subjects were not told to try to use the prior stories to help 
solve the radiation problem, only a minority succeeded in generating the 
analogous solution. This decline in transfer performance cannot be attrib- 
uted to faulty encoding of the story analogy, since most subjects were able 
to produce the analogous solution once they were given a hint to apply the 
story. Also, the problem of spontaneous noticing was not limited to 
stories previously encoded into memory. In the Story Second condition of 
Experiment V, many subjects failed to notice the relevance of the story 
even though they had to read, memorize, and recall it after beginning to 
work on the target problem. 
However, even when subjects are not given an explicit hint to use a 
story analogy to solve a problem, the analogy itself can be viewed as a 
hint about a possible solution to the target problem. Previous work on the 
general topic of hints in problem solving, most notably that of Maier 
(1930, 193 l), has used hints that involve objects that are incorporated into 
the solution directly, rather than analogically. It is therefore difftcult to 
compare the present results with earlier research on hints. For example, 
in one investigation of the use of hints in the “two-string” problem, the 
experimenter “accidentally” brushed against one string and set it in mo- 
tion (Maier, 1931). This hint was very effective in eliciting the “pen- 
dulum” solution (attaching objects as weights and setting the strings in 
motion); yet subjects rarely reported being aware of using the hint, unless 
they gave the solution in separate stages, rather than all at once. This 
experiment is most comparable to the conditions in Experiments IV and V 
in which an analogy was made available to subjects in the guise of a recall 
task, but subjects were not told that the story analogy was a hint to help 
solve the radiation problem. In apparent contrast to Maier’s results, most 
subjects in these conditions who generated the dispersion solution re- 
ported using the story to do so. Thus it seems that our subjects were usu- 
ally aware of the usefulness of the prior story, although the precise time 
at which they noticed its relevance is unclear from the data (since these 
were post-hoc reports). 
Why should subjects so often fail to notice the relevance of a story 
analogy to a target problem when a hint to use the story is not provided? 
One might argue that this result is not particularly surprising, since the 
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story was presented in a different experimental context (a story recall 
experiment). The difficulty of the recall context may be related to the 
problem of identifying the optimal level of abstraction for representing an 
analogy, as we discussed in the Introduction. A recall task, with its em- 
phasis on memory for specific wording, may lead the person to represent 
the story at a level of macrostructure too detailed to maximize its analogi- 
cal correspondence with the target problem. A hint to use the story may 
lead the person to derive a more abstract level of macrostructure, better 
suited for the problem-solving task. 
But in any case, the issue of how analogies are noticed is a very general 
one. A potential analogy may often be encoded in a very different context 
from that in which the target problem appears. Indeed, the basic problem 
in using an analogy between remote domains is to connect two bodies of 
information from disparate semantic contexts. More generally, successful 
transfer of learning generally involves overcoming contextual barriers. 
This may not be easy; for example, it is all too common for a student to fail 
to notice the relevance of knowledge acquired in one class to a problem 
encountered in another. 
The problem of how analogies are noticed is closely related to the issue 
of how analogies are accessed in memory. Noticing that information in 
memory is relevant to a target problem is part of the process of retrieving 
an analogy. These problems were side-stepped in Experiments I-III, 
since subjects received a hint to use the story analogies and were allowed 
to reread them at any time. The problem of memory access was greatest in 
Experiment IV, in which the relevant story analogy was memorized in the 
context of two irrelevant distractor stories. Subjects in this experiment 
seemed to have little difficulty in identifying the appropriate story in 
memory, and applying it to the target problem, as long as they were 
instructed to do so. However, subjects may have performed this task by 
simply testing each of the three stories to see if it suggested a solution to 
the target problem. Such a strategy would presumably be impractical in 
most everyday problem-solving situations, where virtually any piece of 
information in memory might potentially afford a useful analogy. 
How might potential analogies be accessed in memory? Is the memory 
search process directed, and if so, how? At one extreme the problem 
solver may not actually search memory at all; rather, he or she may 
simply “stumble upon” an analogy. That is, after a piece of knowledge 
has for some reason become the focus of attention, the person may spon- 
taneously notice its analogous relationship to a problem yet to be solved. 
It also seems plausible, however, that people may sometimes locate use- 
ful analogies in memory on the basis of a conscious search process. It may 
be possible to use a representation of the current problem as a retrieval 
cue for accessing analogous problems. Perhaps in some cases the person 
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first begins working on a problem and arrives at an abstract characteriza- 
tion of a potential solution, as we discussed in Experiment I. This solution 
representation might then be used to retrieve an analogous problem with 
that type of solution, which could then be used to help generate a more 
concrete solution to the target problem. The latter possibility is related to 
the solution-focusing strategy discussed in connection with Experiment I. 
A better understanding of how analogies are retrieved and noticed is 
clearly essential in order to effectively teach the use of analogies as a 
heuristic strategy for problem solving (Polya, 1957). 
The Generality of the Mapping Process 
The mapping process involved in the use of analogies may play a role in 
a variety of cognitive skills. Using an analogy involves mapping the repre- 
sentations of two (or perhaps more) instances onto one another. Similar 
processes may also be involved in abstracting the relational structure 
common to a set of particular instances. In the domain of problem solving, 
for example, a person who encounters several analogies to the radiation 
problem might eventually derive a schema for “dispersion-type” prob- 
lems. This schema would presumably be structured much like a concrete 
instance of a dispersion problem (cf. Figure l), except that the predicates 
and arguments would be more abstract. A person equipped with such a 
general schema could then solve new dispersion-type problems by map- 
ping them directly onto it. These observations suggest that similar map- 
ping processes may be involved in three distinct but interrelated ac- 
tivities: (1) comparing one instance to another; (2) deriving a schema for a 
class of instances; and (3) comparing an instance to a general schema. 
Note that the above description of the role of mapping potentially 
applies not just to problem solving, but to a wide range of cognitive skills 
requiring concept learning and classification of instances. Such skills are 
involved in tasks that vary a great deal in terms of both complexity and 
cognitive domain. For example, the mapping of correspondences between 
relational structures is involved in the use of schemata for story under- 
standing (Rumelhart, 1975), frames for scene perception (Minsky, 1975), 
and scripts for understanding of social behavior (Abelson, 1975). Such 
structures all serve to describe our ability to deal with novel instances of 
familiar situations. Theories in each domain must explain how abstract 
structures can be derived from a set of instances, and how instances can 
be related to each other and to abstract structures. 
If similar mapping processes are involved in analogical problem solving 
and other cognitive skills, then the study of the use of analogies to solve 
problems has implications that extend to other domains. We mentioned at 
the beginning of this paper that an analogy may often serve as a model to 
guide the development of a new theory. In a similar fashion a theory of 
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analogical problem solving might serve as a useful model in developing 
theories in other areas of cognition. 
APPENDIX I 
Story Analogies Used in Experiment I 
First Paragraph (All Stories) 
A small country fell under the iron rule of a dictator. The dictator ruled 
the country from a strong fortress. The fortress was situated in the middle 
of the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads radiated 
outward from the fortress like spokes on a wheel. A great general arose 
who raised a large army at the border and vowed to capture the fortress 
and free the country of the dictator. The general knew that if his entire 
army could attack the fortress at once it could be captured. His troops 
were poised at the head of one of the roads leading to the fortress, ready 
to attack. However, a spy brought the general a disturbing report. The 
ruthless dictator had planted mines on each of the roads. The mines were 
set so that small bodies of men could pass over them safely, since the 
dictator needed to be able to move troops and workers to and from the 
fortress. However, any large force would detonate the mines. Not only 
would this blow up the road and render it impassable, but the dictator 
would then destroy many villages in retaliation. A full-scale direct attack 
on the fortress therefore appeared impossible. 
Second Paragraph, Attack-Dispersion Story (Version 1) 
The general, however, was undaunted. He divided his army up into 
small groups and dispatched each group to the head of a different road. 
When all was ready he gave the signal, and each group charged down a 
different road. All of the small groups passed safely over the mines, and 
the army then attacked the fortress in full strength. In this way, the 
general was able to capture the fortress and overthrow the dictator. 
Second Paragraph, Open Supply Route Story 
The general, however, was undaunted. He knew that one major 
thoroughfare leading to the fortress was always kept open as a supply 
route. He led his army to the head of the supply route. When all was ready 
he gave the signal, and the entire army charged down the open route. The 
army avoided the mines and attacked the fortress in full strength. In this 
way, the general was able to capture the fortress and overthrow the dic- 
tator. 
Second Paragraph, Tunnel Story 
The general, however, was undaunted. He and his men dug an under- 
ground tunnel beneath the mines following the route of the road to the 
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fortress. When the tunnel was dug, the men crawled through it until they 
arrived safely at the foot of the fortress. Here they all gathered together 
and attacked the fortress in full strength. In this way, the general was able 
to capture the fortress and overthrow the dictator. 
APPENDIX II 
Story Analogies Used in Experiment II 
Attack-Dispersion Story (Version 2) 
A small country was controlled by a dictator. The dictator ruled the 
country from a strong fortress. The fortress was situated in the middle of 
the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads radiated out- 
ward from the fortress like spokes on a wheel. A general arose who raised 
a large army and vowed to capture the fortress and free the country of the 
dictator. The general knew that if his entire army could attack the fortress 
at once it could be captured. The general’s troops were gathered at the 
head of one of the roads leading to the fortress, ready to attack. However, 
a spy brought the general a disturbing report. The ruthless dictator had 
planted mines on each of the roads. The mines were set so that small 
bodies of men could pass over them safely, since the dictator needed to be 
able to move troops and workers to and from the fortress. However, any 
large force would detonate the mines. Not only would this blow up the 
road and render it impassable, but the dictator would then destroy many 
villages in retaliation. It therefore seemed impossible to mount a full-scale 
direct attack on the fortress. 
The general, however, knew just what to do. He divided his army up 
into small groups and dispatched each group to the head of a different 
road. When all was ready he gave the signal, and each group marched 
down a different road. Each group continued down its road to the fortress, 
so that the entire army finally arrived together at the fortress at the same 
time. In this way, the general was able to capture the fortress, and thus 
overthrow the dictator. 
Parade-Dispersion Story 
A small country was controlled by a dictator. The dictator ruled the 
country from a strong fortress. The fortress was situated in the middle of 
the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads radiated out- 
ward from the fortress like spokes on a wheel. To celebrate the anniver- 
sary of his rise to power, the dictator ordered his general to conduct a 
full-scale military parade. On the morning of the anniversary, the gen- 
eral’s troops were gathered at the head of one of the roads leading to the 
fortress, ready to march. However, a lieutenant brought the general a 
disturbing report. The dictator was demanding that this parade had to be 
more impressive than any previous parade. He wanted his army to be 
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seen and heard at the same time in every region of the country. Further- 
more, the dictator was threatening that if the parade was not sufficiently 
impressive he was going to strip the general of his medals and reduce him 
to the rank of private. But it seemed impossible to have a parade that 
could be seen throughout the whole country. 
The general, however, knew just what to do. He divided his army up 
into small groups and dispatched each group to the head of a different 
road. When all was ready he gave the signal, and each group marched 
down a different road. Each group continued down its road to the fortress, 
so that the entire army finally arrived together at the fortress at the same 
time. In this way, the general was able to have the parade seen and heard 
through the entire country at once, and thus please the dictator. 
APPENDIX III 
Story Analogy Used in Experiments IV and V 
Attack-Dispersion Story (Version 3) 
(1) A small country was ruled (2) [from a strong fortress] by a king. (3) 
The fortress was situated in the middle of the country (4) surrounded by 
farms and villages. (5) Many roads radiated outward from the fortress (6) 
like spokes on a wheel. (7) A rebel general vowed (8) to capture the 
fortress. (9) The general knew that (10) an attack (11) [by his entire army] 
would capture the fortress. (12) He gathered his army (13) at the head of 
one of the roads. (14) However, the general learned that (15) the king had 
planted mines (16) on each of the roads. (17) The mines were set (18) so 
that (19) [small] bodies of men could pass over them safely, (20) since the 
king needed (21) to move his troops and workers to and from the fortress. 
(22) However, any (23) [large] force would detonate the mines. (24) Not 
only would this blow up the road (25) and render it impassable, (26) but it 
would also destroy many neighboring villages. (27) It therefore seemed 
impossible (28) to mount a (29) [full-scale direct] attack on the fortress. 
(30) The general, however, knew just what to do. (31) He divided his army 
up into small groups (32) and dispatched each group (33) to the head of a 
different road. (34) When all was ready (35) he gave the signal (36) and 
each group marched down a different road. (37) Each group continued 
down its road to the fortress (38) so that the (39) [entire] army finally 
arrived (40) [together] at the fortress at the same time. (41) The fortress 
fell (42) and the king was forced (43) to flee into exile. 
APPENDIX IV 
Distractor Stories Used in Experiment IV 
The Wine Merchants 
One day a rich man found that his wine cellar was empty. So he sent out 
messengers to announce a generous offer. The first person to bring the 
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rich man a barrel of wine would be given a brick of solid gold. However, 
the offer would expire at sundown. 
Two wine merchants heard the news. Each had a horse-drawn cart 
loaded with large barrels of wine. They both set out for the duke’s palace 
at once. An hour before sundown they came to a place where the bridge 
had been washed out by a raging river. The first merchant drove his 
horses and cart into the flood in a desperate attempt to reach the other 
side. But the horses were already exhausted and could not fight the cur- 
rent. The cart overturned, and the horses, wine, and driver were washed 
away. 
The second merchant tried a different tactic. He poured the wine out of 
all but one of his barrels, and lashed them together to form a raft; then he 
loaded the one full barrel, a horse, and himself on top. He set the raft 
adrift and floated downstream. In a few minutes the raft came to rest on 
the shore in front of the town where the rich man lived. The merchant 
disembarked, loaded the wine barrel on the horse, and led it to the rich 
man’s house. He arrived just as the sun was setting, and collected the gold 
brick as a reward for his efforts. 
The Identical Twins 
Once there were identical twins who were continually playing pranks 
on their family, friends, and teachers. The annual school picnic was al- 
ways a big event for the twins. There were races and other athletic events 
in which the twins won lots of prizes. One year a new student arrived who 
was a star runner. The twins wanted to win the main event: the 2-mile race 
through the woods behind the school. So they secretly devised a plan 
which would enable them to outdo the newcomer. 
The day of the race arrived. Each runner was to pick his own path 
through the woods to a clearing, where a teacher stood posted to deter- 
mine the winner. One twin entered the race, while the other excused 
himself on the grounds that he had hurt his leg in an earlier broadjumping 
event. The race began and the students rushed into the woods. The twin 
rushed into the woods and waited until the others had passed out of sight. 
Then he went back to the school using a path hidden from the picnic area. 
Shortly after, the other twin, who had been hiding behind a rock near the 
finish line of the race, burst out and ran into the clearing ahead of the 
other runners. The teacher named him the winner and marveled at the 
speed of his running. Next year the twins switched places and thereafter 
maintained their status on this event. 
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